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The United States is involved in strategies of counter-terrorism in many countries around the globe. 
Al-Shabaab in Somalia has been a United States designated foreign terrorist organisation since 
2008.  The objective of this dissertation is to determine the nature of contemporary counter-
terrorism strategy undertaken by the United States toward Somalia and to understand how it has 
been determined and sustained over time.  
In order to identify the specific type of counter-terrorism strategy applied to that country, a 
typology of four counter-terrorism strategies undertaken by the United States toward other 
countries has been developed. The secondary but closely related question this dissertation 
attempts to answer is which determinants, or factors, have caused a shift or change in the United 
States counter-terrorism strategy in Somalia. By identifying determinants that affect strategy, the 
justification for a change, shift, or stayed course in strategy is made clearer. The typology and key 
determinants were initially assessed beyond Somalia to include insights from United States 
involvement in countries such as Vietnam and Afghanistan. 
This dissertation contends that that the United States has been engaged in the same 
counter-terrorism strategy against al-Shabaab since the early days of its re-engagement in the 
Somali conflict. Applying the typology to situational analysis dating back to as early as 2002, it 
becomes clear that the United States employs and has maintained a complex/combined counter-
terrorism strategy toward Somalia. In fact, the research conducted for this dissertation supports 
the overall argument that complex/combined counter-terrorism strategy is especially broad, which 
enables the United States to prioritise a light military footprint and low costs of involvement in 
combating al-Shabaab without becoming heavily involved. The malleable nature of this strategy 
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Timeline of the Somali Conflict 
1991 Mohamed Siad Barre ousted amidst a deadly power struggle between clan warlords. 
1992 During Operation Restore Hope, U.S. marines arrive to help UN peacekeepers restore order. 
1993 Eighteen U.S. army Rangers are killed when Somali militias shoot down two US helicopters in 
Mogadishu. 
1995 UN peacekeepers withdraw, having failed. 
2006 Following fierce fighting, militias loyal to the Islamic Courts Union defeat clan warlords and 
take Mogadishu; Ethiopian troops enter Somalia. 
2007 UN Security Council approves six-month peacekeeping mission; African Union troops land in 
Mogadishu amid battles between Islamist insurgents and government forces backed by Ethiopian 
troops. 
2008 U.S. designates al-Shabaab a foreign terrorist organization  
2010 Al-Shabaab announces alliance with Al Qaeda and launches a major offensive in the capital. 
2011 (July) Al-Shabaab pulls out of Mogadishu, UN declares famine in Somalia and airlifts aid to 
Mogadishu, (October) Kenyan troops enter Somalia to attacks rebels  
2012 Members of Parliament elect Hassan Sheikh Mohamud president over incumbent Sharif 
Sheikh Ahmed. 
2013 (June) Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys is arrested by government troops, (September) Al-
Shabaab kill over 60 people at Westgate Mall in a Nairobi in retaliation for Kenya's military 
involvement  
2015 Al-Shabaab kill 147 people during the Garissa University attack in eastern Kenya.  
2016 AU increases its military presence after heightened al-Shabaab attacks. 
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Chapter 1: The Nature of U.S.  Somali Relations  
Introduction  
On May 5th 2017, a member of the Navy “Sea, Air and Land” (SEAL) force became the first American 
casualty in Somalia since 1993, marking an escalation in U.S. military involvement in the country. 
Only a month before, the Trump administration had authorised, for the first time since 1994, the 
deployment of regular troops to the East African country.1 The SEAL member was part of an 
“advise, assist, and accompany” mission to fight al-Shabaab, the Somali-based Islamist militant 
group.2 The officer's death reignited the debate around the legality of American overseas combat 
operations and called into question the strategic objective and motivation of U.S. counter-terrorism 
operations against al-Shabaab in Somalia. What is the nature of contemporary United States 
counter-terrorism strategy toward Somalia and how it has been determined and sustained over 
time?  
In recent years, the primary U.S. mission in Somalia has been training African Union (AU) 
and Somali governmental forces to fight al-Shabaab. However, U.S. operatives have been working 
sporadically in the country since 2002, when the government first began investigating the 
movement of al-Qaeda militants in the early days of the War of Terror.3 U.S. forces have carried out 
at least 42 ‘strikes’ in Somalia since 2007, killing up to 449 alleged members of non-state armed 
groups and approximately 28 civilians.4 Additionally, U.S. personnel have allegedly interfered with 
or been involved in internal political struggles since 2006. 5  Even before American counter-
terrorism activity in Somalia became public knowledge, U.S. engagement there entailed a series of 
interventions that spanned from military aid to peacekeeping to nation-building. Before we assess 
U.S. counter-terrorism behavior toward Somalia, we must address historical relations between the 
two countries and Somalia’s regional neighbours.  
For many, Somalia provokes thoughts of piracy, refugees, famine, and a never-ending civil war 
which began with the deposition of President Siad Barre in 1991. However, the country’s geo-
                                                             
1 Conor Gaffey, “U.S. Kills Al-Shabaab Leader in Somalia in Drone Attack,” Newsweek, August 4, 2017, 
http://www.newsweek.com/us-military-al-shabab-trump-somalia-646462. 
2 Ibid.  
3 President Bush first used the term in an address to Congress on 20 September 2001. 
4 Conor Gaffey, “Why is Trump Sending More U.S. Troops to Somalia?” Newsweek, April 19, 2017, 
http://www.newsweek.com/us-troops-somalia-donald-trump-al-shabab-586004. 
5 Victor Obure and Boniface Ongeri, “Kenya: Marines Mission Shrouded in Mystery,” The East African Standard December 
3, 2006, http://allafrica.com/stories/200612041176.html; Victor Obure, “Suspicion as U.S. Marines Hit Town,” The East 
African Standard, November 16, 2006, http://allafrica.com/stories/200611170008.html; and The Bureau of Investigative 




political position and historical relationship with terrorist groups heightens its importance to the 
international community. Officially, U.S. foreign policy objectives in Somalia are to promote political 
and economic stability, to prevent the use of Somalia as a haven for international terrorism and to 
alleviate the ongoing humanitarian crisis.6 These policy objectives are politically enforced by 
interagency commitments to strengthening the country’s democratic institutions, improving 
security and stability, and to increase the delivery of services to Somali people.7 Nonetheless, as a 
student in 2009, before he was Prime Minister of President of Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi 
‘Farmajo’ Mohamed asked whether the United States had become involved in Somalia for Somalia’s 
sake or for self-serving reasons.8 
Often referred to as part of the “Horn of Africa”, Somalia is a coastal East African country 
bordered by Kenya to the south, Ethiopia to the west, and Djibouti to the north. The coastline of 
Somalia is 3,300 kilometers in length. The territory juts out into the Indian Ocean and lies just 32 
kilometers south of Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula. There, the bab-el-Mandreb Strait forms an 
occlusion between Africa and the Middle East and serves as a gateway that links the Mediterranean 
Sea to the Indian Ocean. Geographically, the country’s location presents rich opportunity for 
international trade. But its unguarded coastline also serves as a haven for illegal trade and piracy, 
which has received considerable security, economic, and political analysis from the likes of Roger 
Middleton, Raymond Gilpin, Percy, Shortland and many others.9 Somalia’s proximity to Yemen 
creates a doorway for al-Qaeda to communicate and supply not only al-Shabaab but the rest of its 
African affiliates.10  
Somalia has been described as a “failed state”.11 According to the World Health Organization, 
the average life expectancy from birth in the country is 55 years.12 Over the years Somalis have 
clashed over resources, endured harsh weather conditions, such as, periodic recurring drought and 
                                                             
6 "U.S. Relations with Somalia," U.S. Department of State, April 12, 2017, Accessed July 15, 2017, 
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm. 
7 Bureau of African Affairs “U.S. Relations With Somalia Fact Sheet,” U.S. Department of State, April 12, 2017,  
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm.  
8 Mohamed A. Mohamed, US strategic interest in Somalia: From Cold War era to war on terror, State University of New 
York at Buffalo, 2009: 55. 
9 For more detailed analysis of piracy in Somalia see: Roger Middleton, Piracy in Somalia: Threatening global trade, feeding 
local wars, Chatham House (Royal Institute of International Affairs), 2008; Gilpin, Raymond. "Counting the costs of Somali 
piracy," (2009); Sarah Percy and Anja Shortland, "The business of piracy in Somalia," Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 4 
(2013): 541-578. 
10 Mantzikos, Ioannis. "Somalia and Yemen: the links between terrorism and state failure." Digest of Middle East 
Studies 20, no. 2 (2011): 242-260. 
11 "Most-failed state: Twenty-five years of chaos in the Horn of Africa," The Economist, September 10, 2016, 
https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21706522-twenty-five-years-chaos-horn-africa-most-failed-
state. 
12 WHO, Somalia.  
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the 2004 tsunami. In 2001, famine and unending violence caused by clan fighting overwhelmed the 
population and lead thousands to flee into Kenya to what would become the world’s largest refugee 
camp, Dadaab.13 These domestic security factors, along with international meddling by the U.S. and 
other states in aspects of domestic politics contributed to an environment ripe for terrorist activity.   
Historic Origin of U.S. Somali Relations   
Somalia achieved independence from its British and Italian colonizers on July 1st, 1960. For nearly a 
decade following independence, the United States and the Soviet Union both pursued the 
government of Somalia in order to broadening their preferred ideology and strategic advantages. 
For a time, the young country implemented democracy and capitalism in order to attract economic 
aid from the West. But negligence in developing infrastructure led to a struggling economy.14 In 
1969, after years of playing both sides for military aid and economic incentives, Somalia aligned 
economically and ideologically with the Soviet Union when General Mohamed Siad Barre 
implemented ‘scientific socialism’ policies.15 Consanguinity with the USSR held until 1977 when 
Somalia instigated the Ogaden War by invading Ethiopia, pitting regional rivals both aligned with 
the Soviet Union against each other. The USSR eventually endorsed Ethiopia’s claim to the Ogaden 
region and cut off support for Somalia. When Soviet advisors, 16,000 Cuban troops, and airlifted aid 
arrived in support of Ethiopia, the Somali government withdrew from its military offensive and 
returned to its alliance with the West.16 According to Lefebvre, U.S. relations with Barre’s regime 
continued until 1991, when infighting led the U.S. embassy in Somalia to close, effectively halting 
formal diplomatic relations. This year (1991) also signified the weakening of Somalia’s strategic 
value to the U.S. in its struggle against communism in Africa. From 1992 to 1994, the 
administrations of President George H.W. Bush and later President Clinton joined with the UN in 
Operation Restore Hope, a humanitarian operation deploying 30,000 peacekeepers to bring food 
and emergency aid to the Somali people facing extreme drought and famine.17 However, during this 
period of humanitarian assistance, the ‘numerous efforts at mediation and reconciliation’ attempted 
by the U.S. and the UN perpetuated perceptions of western meddling in Somali politics. For 
                                                             
13 UNHCR, Refugees in the Horn of Africa: Somali Displacement Crisis.  
14 Mohamed A. Mohamed, US strategic interest in Somalia: From Cold War era to war on terror, State University of New 
York at Buffalo, 2009: 55.  
15 Abdi Ismail Samatar, "Structural adjustment as development strategy? Bananas, boom, and poverty in 
Somalia," Economic Geography 69, no. 1 (1993): 25-43. 
16 Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, “Arms for the Horn: US security policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953–1991,” University of 
Pittsburgh Pre, 1992: 149-175.  




instance, Washington worked to oust a powerful warlord, Mohamed Farrah Aidid.18 In his research, 
President Mohamed Farmajo argues that the Battle of Mogadishu, which was disastrous for the U.S. 
and its allies, was a consequence of political meddling. The resultant Somali civilian hostility toward 
U.S. and allied soldiers was tied to the role of foreign influencers in domestic challenges.19 The 
battle also signified the beginning of an exodus of international aid and attention from the 
decimated country.  
From 1996 onwards, the U.S. shifted its foreign policy away from diplomatic engagement in 
unstable African states to one that attempted to contain unrest and insecurity within a country’s 
borders.20 Officials worked to contain Somalia’s problems within its borders, in order to prevent 
destabilisation in neighbouring countries.21 This dissertation will support the argument that during 
this period, by engaging in only one aspect of state-building counter-terrorism strategy – 
containment – and by ignoring humanitarian, economic and institutional vacuums, the United 
States facilitated the growth of terrorist activity in Somalia. After a decade of containment policy, 
fears of a power vacuum and the spread of an al-Qaeda haven in Somalia forced the United States to 
re-engage in stabilizing the country.  
As will be explained, the United States interests in Somalia are mostly centered on 
geopolitical interests in the region; halting the spread of international terrorism, protecting military 
bases, government buildings, financial investments and American companies operating in Somalia 
and neighboring states. Geopolitical strategic interests are far more important than economic trade. 
Bilateral economic trade between the two countries is minimal, with the U.S. importing around $1 
million per annum.22 For perspective, the U.S. imported $7.3 billion in goods from South Africa in 
2015.23 However, the only permanent U.S. military base in Africa, Camp Lemonnier is located in 
Djibouti, just north of Somalia. Djibouti has become the landing pad for international posturing in 
Africa. China, Saudi Arabia, Japan and France also have military bases in that country. Camp 
Lemonnier represents the growing U.S. military and economic involvement in the region, which is 
                                                             
18 John Norris and Bronwyn Bruton, “The Price of Failure: How much has the collapse of Somalia cost the world? $55 
billion-- and here’s where it went,” Foreign Policy, October 5, 2011, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/05/the-price-of-
failure/.  
19 Mohamed A. Mohamed, US strategic interest in Somalia: From Cold War era to war on terror, State University of New 
York at Buffalo, 2009: 17-20. 
20 Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul M. Kennedy, The pivotal states: a new framework for US policy in the developing world, 
WW Norton & Company, 1999. 
21Johnnie Carson, “U.S. Policy in Somalia” (speech, Washington, D.C., March 12, 2010), U.S. Department of State Bureau of 
African Affairs, https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2010/138314.htm.  
22 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Somalia economic relations, https://ustr.gov/countries-
regions/africa/east-africa/somalia.  
23 Office of the U.S. Trade Representatives, U.S. Africa economic relations, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa. 
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further demonstrated by the display of guardianship of the U.S. Navy along the East African 
coastline. Strategically, the international presence throughout the region represents growing 
competition for Africa’s resources. As such, the terrorist organisation al-Shabaab is not a military 
threat to the physical locations of U.S. territories but its capacity to interrupt regional trade and 
economic stability in the region does create security concerns at impact U.S. foreign relations.  
The economic environment in Somalia has not improved very much in the period since the 
United States became involved in counter-terrorism operations there. The Human Development 
Index (HDI) of Somalia is one of the lowest in the world at 0.285.24 Even after accounting for over 
$1 billion in humanitarian, economic, and military assistance the country continues to teeter.25 Al-
Shabaab has been weakened but it has not been defeated, indicating that throwing money at the 
problem has not created a sustainable solution. The October 14th truck bomb attack in Mogadishu at 
the end of 2017 killed over 500 people. The attack was the deadliest since al-Shabaab began its 
insurgency in 2007.26 However, attacks on foreign soil have diminished, making the United States 
involvement in the country all the more complicated.27 Therefore, with limited success in halting 
the terrorist group and unsteady political and economic progress, the time has come for a thorough 
analysis of strategies undertaken by the United States in order to chart the way forward in Somalia. 
After more than a decade of battling the resilient terrorist organisation, it remains unclear 
how U.S. strategy is determined and to what extent it has been effective in achieving objectives. This 
dissertation will outline the discernible variations in U.S. counter-terrorism strategy in Somalia and 
assess the determinants that affect a shift in the manner of engagement. A typology has been 
formatted to assemble the counter-terrorism strategies employed by U.S. in another country. The 
typology pulls from previous engagement in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Mali, and Yemen, among 
others. By situating U.S. counter-terrorism strategy and policy toward Somalia within a historical 
and conceptual framework, this dissertation aims to understand the consequences of the chosen 
strategy in combating al-Shabaab. Those consequences include future stability in Somalia as well as 
protecting U.S. territories and citizens. Chapter 2 will broadly identify the four strategy types and 
various determinant factors which affect U.S. counter-terrorism in another country. Chapter 3 will 
provide a historic overview of conflict and insecurity in Somalia by detailing the rise of al-Shabaab. 
                                                             
24 Somalia, UNDP, "Somalia Human Development Report," (2012). 
25 Taken from USAID foreign assistance data, https://www.usaid.gov/somalia.  
26 Abdi Sheikh, "Death toll from Somalia truck bomb in October now at 512: probe committee," Reuters, November 30, 
2017, Accessed December 02, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-blast-toll/death-toll-from-somalia-
truck-bomb-in-october-now-at-512-probe-committee-idUSKBN1DU2IC. 
27 Stig Jarle Hansen and Christopher Anzalone, "After the Mogadishu Attacks," Foreign Affairs, November 03, 2017, 
Accessed January 09, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/somalia/2017-11-03/after-mogadishu-attacks. 
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The third chapter will also provide definitions of terrorism and counter-terrorism, before moving 
into the development of early U.S. counter-terrorism strategy in Somalia. Chapter 4 will identify the 
type of U.S. counter-terrorism strategy applied toward Somalia and assess the role of determinants 
in affecting the chosen strategy.  The final chapter summarizes how U.S. counter-terrorism strategy 
has been shaped, how it has changed or stayed the same since 2006 and lays out suggestions for 












Chapter 2: Typology and Determinants of U.S. Counter-terrorism Strategy 
Research Question  
This dissertation discusses and develops a typology of counter-terrorism strategies undertaken by 
one country toward another country. The principal question this research attempts to answer is 
what the nature of contemporary United States counter-terrorism strategy is toward Somalia, and 
how it has been determined and sustained over time. A secondary but closely related question this 
research attempts to answer is which determinants lead to the resolution of a specific counter-
terrorism strategy. In order to answer these questions, a catalogue of the various strategies that the 
United States may use toward another state in countering terrorism was created and a typology 
was formed for use in future research contiguous to this topic.  
Methodology 
A typology serves as a system of interpretation and classification. As previously mentioned, this 
typology is useful for the assessment of strategic decisions as they relate to counter-terrorism. By 
its nature, this typology is not to be understood as a panacea on the topic. The counter-terrorism 
typology builds upon existing topical frameworks to expand understanding of the nature of 
counter-terrorism responses and associated operational aspects. When applied to a case study, the 
typology allows for the identification of patterns of use but can also draw attention to an 
aberration. For instance, the typology could show that the U.S. adopts similar counter-terrorism 
strategies toward every country in the Middle East except for Saudi Arabia. In this case, Saudi 
Arabia would be aberrant and further research might identify reasons for the divergence.  
Work of this nature has already been carried out. The origin of this typology stems from 
Ami Pedahzur and Magnus Ranstorp, who categorised in A Tertiary Model for Countering Terrorism 
in Liberal Democracies three theoretical ways in which democracies address terrorism.28 The object 
of study in A Tertiary Model is the ‘democratic dilemma’ facing states that aspire to fight terrorism 
while upholding liberal democratic principles. Using the case of Israel, Pedahzur and Ranstorp build 
a framework  around three ‘models’ using field related criteria. It is upon this study that two of the 
strategies further developed within this dissertation are founded: traditional counter-terrorism and 
criminal justice counter-terrorism. Pedahzur and Ranstorp confine their study to liberal democratic 
systems, of which the United States can be counted. However, this assessment of counter-terrorism 
toward Somalia does not confine the subject of study within a framework of democratic principles. 
                                                             
28 Ami Pedahzur and Magnus Ranstorp, "A tertiary model for countering terrorism in liberal democracies: the case of 
Israel," Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 2 (2001): 1-26. 
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Rather, the work of Pedahzur and Ranstorp represents the foundation of this dissertation, which 
expands upon their boundaries to catalogue the types of counter-terrorism strategy of the United 
States toward other states. As such, it has been determined that there are four strategic models to 
be assessed. These strategies are categorized by several indicators including operational goals and 
tactical approach. Within the four identified strategies, the ultimate objective of countering 
terrorism is the same but secondary objectives can and do differ, as will become clear. Some 
strategies aim for secure borders while others operate with the intent to create economic equity 
and stability. One model may suggest halting terrorism through financial sanctions, while another 
suggests neutralising terrorism through de-radicalisation processes and job placement. The local 
and U.S. populations are engaged individually, and levels of public inclusion can vary. Nonetheless, 
irrespective of secondary actions and objectives, the primary purpose of all four types of counter-
terrorism strategy remains the prevention and halting of terrorism. 
The next section of this chapter outlines the four strategies of counter-terrorism 
undertaken by the U.S.  toward another state. The first two categories of counter-terrorism strategy 
– traditional and criminal justice – were taken from the original analysis produced by Pedahzur and 
Ranstorp. The third category was taken from the post-conflict language used in the aftermath of the 
U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.29 The fourth category was created by the author using descriptive 
language found throughout relevant counter-terrorism literature. This typology catalogues the aim 
of a strategy towards the terrorist group(s), the various methods and tactics of engagement used by 
the U.S., external considerations taken into account or ignored, and the level of public engagement 
required for a strategy to become enacted.     
  
                                                             
29 See Barnett R. Rubin, "Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: constructing sovereignty for whose 
security?," Third World Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2006): 175-185. 
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Understanding U.S. Counter-Terrorism Strategy Types 
Table 1: Typology of U.S. Strategies of Countering Terrorism in another Country 





Aim Elimination Prevention through 
democratic security 
system 





No limit to human 
costs 
 







Military is not used 
 
Internal security is 
used sparingly 
Military personnel 










Limited human costs 
 





Drones are targeted and 
rarely used 
 
Airstrikes are targeted 




Operations are run 












terrorist activity as 




Institutional stability is 
priority 
 
‘Hearts and minds’ 
campaigns focus on 
winning over local 
population 
  
Operations are run from 
neighbouring countries 
(can include proxy forces/ 






Heavy intelligence used 
  
Considerations Unilateral in nature 
 
Civilians of invaded 
country are not 
considered 
  






Multinational in nature 
 
Operations do focus on 
local communities to 
avoid alienation 
  
Transnational in nature  
 
Technology increases 
remote response but also 

















Traditional Counter-Terrorism  
Traditional counter-terrorism, a modern adaption of classical war strategy, aims to capture and 
eliminate those who threaten a state using direct military force. Traditional counter-terrorism 
responds to aggression in a retaliatory manner but also aims to preempt speculative attacks.30 This 
strategy requires a strong, sturdy security force capable of enforcing the military strength 
necessary to enact an agenda. Deterrence, which is the act of dissuading potential attacks by threats 
of direct penalties and retribution, is the preferred action of traditional counter-terrorism 
strategy.31 In Deterring the Undeterrable: Coercion, Denial and Deligitimization in Counterterrorism, 
Alex Wilner outlines the transformation of deterrence theory to fit the modern requirements of 
counter-terrorism.32 However, in order for a threat to bear weight it must be re-enforced by a show 
of military strength and intelligence capabilities. Some examples which successfully present a 
state’s capabilities include war games and weapons tests. Within this strategy, tactical retaliation 
always includes the robust use of military, usually including the army as well as smaller specialised 
units. 
Eliminating the threat is the ultimate goal of this strategy, and all others. Other goals shared 
by each strategy are to weaken and eliminate leadership within terrorist organisations and to 
deteriorate the appeal of the violent extremist organisation to potential recruits using intimidation. 
However, the way in which traditional counter-terrorism strategy achieves this goal focuses on the 
use of military force. Kinetic instruments used in the traditional counter-terrorism strategy include 
remotely piloted aircraft like the Predator drone, manned airstrikes, and intelligence gathering. 
Drones are often used to gather intelligence that can help fulfill the military strategy.  
If or when deterrence fails, other methods of achieving strategic objectives within 
traditional counter-terrorism include coercion and retaliation.  In both cases, tactical applications 
differ. Coercion is conceptually tied to diplomacy as a technique for inducing a positive outcome but 
it can also be a disengaging or aggressive tactic that inhibits dialogue and breeds distrust. 
Retaliation is obviously the last course of action when deterrence and coercion fail. In the case of 
retaliation, this strategy relies upon military intervention to stabilize the country and (re)construct 
systems of law and order.33 The early days of the American engagement in Afghanistan closely 
                                                             
30 Alex Wilner, "Contemporary Deterrence Theory and Counterterrorism: A Bridge Too Far," NYUJ Int'l L. & Pol. 47 
(2014): 439. 
31 Bruno S. Frey and Simon Luechinger, "How to fight terrorism: alternatives to deterrence," Defence and Peace Economics 
14, no. 4 (2003): 237-249. 
32 Alex S. Wilner, "Deterring the undeterrable: coercion, denial, and delegitimization in counterterrorism," The Journal of 
Strategic Studies 34, no. 1 (2011): 3-37. 
33 Bronwyn E. Bruton, Somalia: A new approach, No. 52. Council on Foreign Relations, 2010:20-21.   
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resembled traditional counter-terrorism. When al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden planned and 
executed the 9/11 attacks, retaliation was the chosen recourse of the Bush administration and the 
military invasion began in October 2001.  
In international relations theory, the traditional strategy addresses acts of terrorism and 
counter-terrorism using a neo-realist predilection. The state and its interests are the central subject 
of analysis, with minimal consideration given to the population affected.34 In this case, population 
refers to both civilians and the terrorist organisation in conflict with the state. In traditional 
counter-terrorism the state must act in self-reliance and focus on protecting its sovereignty and 
territorial control because the strategy exists within an anarchic worldview.35 The methods of 
engagement are considered hard, direct and kinetic. Negotiations and diplomacy tactics are wholly 
out of step with this strategy and dialogue with the enemy is considered unacceptable.  
Many critiques of this strategy exist in contemporary counter-terrorism literature. Stephen 
Emerson argues that this model employs a strategy that is symptoms-focused consequently making 
it structurally flawed and bound to fail.36 Critical terrorism theorists like Richard Jackson, Stumpt 
and Dixit, outright reject this state-centric discourse around traditional terrorism and counter-
terrorism.37 These authors argue that traditional counter-terrorism in its state-led form is, “non-
reflexive about the effects of portraying particular groups of people as “terrorist”, ignores the role 
of the state as a producer of violence”, is uncommitted to social emancipation, and fails to examine 
the problem and phenomenon of terrorism as a matter straddling politics, economics, law, religion 
and the realm of sociology and cultural studies. 38The strategy is ahistorical; at no stage are 
sociological propositions posed and the underlying structural conditions that fuel terrorism are 
ignored. The traditional model fails to question the causal origin which would lead a group of 
people to turn toward extreme acts of violence. Jo-Ansie van Wyk, Daniel Benjamin, Martha 
Crenshaw and Jakkie Cilliers see a military-only option as counter-intuitive given that terrorists 
often begin their journey as disenfranchised individuals fighting for agency in an ocean of 
inequality. For instance, the increased capacity of intelligence gathering has modernised counter-
terrorism strategy in a way that allows for unparalleled advantage to the state. In collecting and 
analysing this data, the state is able to compile tactical knowledge about the offending groups’ 
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location and movements. However, Daniel Byman explains that intelligence in traditional counter-
terrorism is not used to build pertinent partnerships and environmental knowledge which could 
enable greater understanding of the nurturing factors that spread violent extremism in the first 
place.39 There also exists the argument that the traditional approach to counter-terrorism allows a 
solution for only the political actor, calling to question the role of non-state actors in the modern 
world, which terrorist organisations are broadly considered.40  
Practically, the traditional model of counter-terrorism is costly, time consuming, and 
requires high levels of political and popular support. Lastly, in this model of counter-terrorism the 
burden of responsibility is placed directly upon the state in the case of lost lives, battles, or wars, 
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Criminal Justice Counter-Terrorism  
Pedahzur and Ranstorp explain their criminal justice model of counter-terrorism as one which 
enables democracies to conform to national principles in the fight against terrorism. Perhaps one 
reason the model could not be applied in practice, as is discussed by the authors is because it 
presumes that by adhering to the principles of a state, the strategy will almost always be less 
effective in achieving overall counter-terrorism objective than other less rigid options.41  
According to Pedahzur and Ranstorp, within the criminal justice strategy, acts of terror are 
prosecuted as crimes within the standard judicial system of the state. The terrorist is pursued, 
arrested, and penalised using the standard domestic judicial system set in place and is tried as a 
criminal. Direct forces such as the military are either used sparingly or not at all. In extreme cases, 
responses to acts of terrorism are operationalised through national police and/ or national security 
forces entrusted to enforce an authority standard with non-terrorist criminal action.42 Common 
characteristics of this strategy include faith in the rule of law as well as the possibility of de-
radicalisation and re-integration for the actor(s) in question. Within the criminal justice model, “the 
rule of law is paramount, while in traditional counter-terrorism, it is the rules of war that prevail.” 
43 The zero-sum argument made by traditional counter-terrorism leaves no room for deliberation 
or dialogue and often prevents the terrorist (criminal) from receiving a fair trial. Proponents of the 
criminal justice strategy suggest that to upholds the values of democracy; a state must apply its 
domestic values and rights to all individuals or groups, especially those who work to dismantle said 
values and principles.44 
However, the criminal justice strategy assumes that the state apparatus is capable of 
defending its institutions, that it possesses a security force, and that it adheres rigidly to its 
constitutional boundaries. Therefore, countering terrorism based upon a system of criminal justice 
can be limited in cases where no effective judicial system exists. It is not coincidental that violent 
extremist organisations often station themselves in territories where domestic infrastructure is 
limited, has failed, or does little to impede the actions and aims of the terrorist group.  
While assessing the motivations of terrorists in Africa, Jakkie Cilliers distinguishes 
terrorism from common law crimes by pointing out that terrorist motivations are disinterested in 
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financial gain and as such set terrorist action apart from common criminality.45 This school of 
thought has been adopted by many governments and international institutions, making the 
argument for internal criminal justice difficult to apply. Another contentious issue with this 
strategy is whether terrorists should be granted human rights as no terrorist group has signed the 
Geneva Convention and terrorist behaviour is mostly considered inhumane and illegal, making the 
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State-Building Counter-Terrorism  
Where traditional counter-terrorism implements a direct military strategy using robust military 
deployment, drones, specialised military units, and transnational intelligence weapons to isolate 
and destroy terrorist cells, the state-building strategy uses less direct methods to gain the ‘hearts 
and minds’ of those involved parties. The fundamental principles of the state-building strategy rests 
on the spread of democracy through international institutions and ensuring the safety and security 
of the population through a system based on law and order. 46 The nation-building argument is one 
that confronts traditional perceptions of eliminating terrorist threats. Rather, this strategy suggests 
that ecosystem inefficiencies need first to be eliminated in order to halt the spread of violent 
extremism. As such, state-building counter-terrorism focuses on population-centric preventative 
methods that have the capacity to build local infrastructure, economies, political and security 
systems.  
State-building aims to minimise local entanglement and heightened risk through the use of 
non-aggressive tactics. Rather than a unilateral military intervention, a state or group of states will 
fund and train local security forces if possible. If the local forces do not exist, transnational forces 
become instrumental to the strategy. Generally, a multinational force would be made up of 
peacekeepers from regional neighbors. This kind of force, while technically a deployment of troops, 
is usually observed as less threatening and less alien than a unilateral invasion. This approach 
depends upon international institutions and peacekeeping mechanisms such as humanitarian 
assistance and diplomacy as primary tactical instruments set in place to mitigate anarchy. 
Objectives are generally laid out within temporal layers, with short term goals and much longer-
term ambitions. Unlike the traditional strategy which is based on the neo-realist self-preservation 
of the physical state, the state-building counter-terrorism strategy accounts for humanistic 
perspectives within decisions. The security is cooperative rather than individualized because 
proponents like Bruton believe that the population is less likely to become angered by indirect 
engagement and the visible presence of regional neighbors in military uniform rather than 
antithetic foreigners.47 Robert Pape views the presence of armies of occupation as a major cause of 
terrorism and in that sense considers al-Shabaab a ‘child’ of the War on Terror.48  
Theoretically, state-building counter-terrorism adheres to several tenets of neo-liberalism. 
Proponents of this strategy believe that it was successfully applied in the 1990’s. Indeed, The 
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Insecure American maintains that during that era, America “exported democracy and good 
governance”, was committed to civil and human rights, and shone as a beacon of hope to those 
working to replace a dictatorial regime with multiparty democracy.49 Others would argue that 
perspective misrepresents and idealized American counter-terrorism policy. That decade and the 
ones before it were part of a period of active containment, as previously discussed. Just as 
deterrence is a characteristic of traditional counter-terrorism, containment falls within the state-
building strategy due to its non-kinetic distinctiveness. While the term was used throughout the 
20th century in reference to the Cold War and relations with the USSR and its proxies, today 
containment refers to the quelling of religious extremist ideology associated with Islam: jihadism. 
Some critics view the strategy of containment as appeasement and an inevitable step toward 
military intervention.50 Others point out that state-building counter-terrorism lacks teeth and fails 
to protect humans and mission critical supplies associated with humanitarian aid.  
As previously discussed, those critical of traditional counter-terrorism argue that state-
building succeeds in addressing conceptual faults within the counter-terrorism lexicon. For them, 
the term ‘terrorist’ is a convenient part of the global narrative that on-boards other nations in 
aggressive tactics and allows for the convenient disregard for democratic principles.51 The state-
building strategy does not argue against the fact that transnational terror networks do exist or that 
they threaten the safety and security of civilians and governments. However, state-building 
counter-terrorism suggests that refugee camps and low-income neighbourhoods are fertile ground 
for militant groups to recruit young men.52 As such, the strategy argues that addressing ecosystem 
inefficiencies must be at the forefront of any counter-terrorism strategy. For instance, within this 
strategy economic development is a decisive condition for preventing youth radicalisation and 
enlistment in terrorist organisations.53 Nonetheless, opinions vary on the effectiveness of this 
strategy. James Piazza disputes the causal link between poverty and terrorism and believes that 
distributing aid to certain inundated regions can prove counter-productive without secure 
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governance systems.54  
The practical application of this strategy remains limited. State-building counter-terrorism 
is expensive and requires long-term commitments.55 In this way, the state-building strategy is 
similar to its more idealistic counterpart; criminal justice counter-terrorism. Few states adhere to 
counter-terrorism without using extraordinary force or extra-legal authority to prevent attacks and 
capture individuals involved in terrorist organisations. For this reason, a fourth model was formed 
to enable liberal democracies to establish a counter-terrorism strategy that attempts to uphold 
some level of democratic principles while combating terrorists in a manner able to achieve high 
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Complex/ Combined Counter-Terrorism  
There are factors of modern terrorism that make cataloguing counter-terrorism strategy difficult. 
For one, while terrorism is ancient, technology has grown the capacity for violent extremists to 
cause physical and human damage. Today, modern comforts can be transformed into deadly 
weapons. Trains, planes, and automobiles are either readily available or easily accessible in most 
places around the world. Consequently, large-scale systems of transportation are often the target of 
terrorist activity. Another factor of modern terrorism which makes it difficult to combat is its 
increasingly transnational nature whereby groups can plan attacks and share information via the 
Internet. These modern “innovations” have made a traditional military offensive somewhat 
antiquated and counter-productive. 
The fourth strategy is built upon characteristics and actions considers by Seth Jones, 
Andrew Liepman, and Nathan Chandler to be ‘tailored engagement’.56 This strategy combines 
aspects of both the traditional and state-building strategies of counter-terrorism in cases when the 
criminal justice strategy is not applicable. Complex/ combined strategy uses both direct and 
indirect methods to combat violent extremist organisations in a way that can address the modern 
challenges described above. Complex/combined prioritises a light military footprint and 
maintaining low costs of involvement, both in terms of financial and human capital. Operations rely 
heavily on special operations units and the use of targeted drone attacks and airstrikes. The 
strategy calls for a very small, nearly unnoticeable presence in the country and on the ground. 
Instead, operations that necessitate human or aerial action are planned and conducted from 
neighboring countries, often meant to demonstrate the limitations of the operation to the local 
population.  
‘Neutralise’ is a term associated with this counter-terrorism strategy.57 Unlike traditional 
ways of countering terrorism, complex/ combined counter-terrorism aims to disarm enemy 
combatants, understanding that complete destruction of the organisation may not be a realistic 
option either financially, politically, or temporally.58 One direct, military method this model 
attempts to neutralise a terrorist threat is interdiction; the act of bombarding enemy positions, 
supply lines, and communications in order to delay and disorganise progress. A common non-
military tactic, often referred to as a smart tactic by the father of ‘soft power’ theory Joseph Nye, is 
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the targeting and interruption of terrorist cell financial support.59  
This strategy is pragmatic in understanding the pivotal role of perception in achieving 
objectives against terrorist organisations in another country. For instance, rather than intervening 
militarily, this strategy calls for funding to be distributed through the regional or international force 
to facilitate training and properly equip local security forces against the threat.60 Support and 
advising roles are another part of complex/ combined strategic operations. Limiting direct military 
engagement and focusing on non-military funding and training makes the apparatus employing this 
strategy dependent upon partner nations. Comity and commitment are required from both regional 
partners and the government of the country of concern.61 As such, humanitarian aid and light-
handed diplomacy are often tools used to achieve strategic objectives. Paradoxically, this strategy is 
not reliant upon political and public approval at home in ways that other models are because it 
relies heavily on covert action in foreign countries to achieves its goals. However, this usually 
means that resources are notably smaller than in a strategy which depends upon public support for 
an intervention or large-scale nation-building operation. The complex/ combined strategy can rely 
on covert action because of the significant technology advances achieved in the intelligence 
apparatus over the last few decades. Human intelligence gathering has always been an aspect of the 
traditional strategy of counter-terrorism. Nonetheless, the advent of GPS and unmanned aerial 
vehicle technology has facilitated non-human intelligence gathering to continue as part of a near 
constant process. Intelligence as a way of preventing attacks and hunting terrorist operatives has 
become the new normal in modern counter-terrorism strategic methods.  
While there are few applicable cases of the criminal justice or state-building strategy, the 
complex/combined counter-terrorism strategy offers us some practical examples, like Afghanistan. 
Counterterrorism involvement in Afghanistan truly transformed over time, indicating mission 
creep to be a symptomatic consequence of this strategy.  In fact, troop levels jumped from several 
hundred in 2001 to 100,000 in 2011.62 Bruce Hoffman, a prominent voice in the field, suggests an 
effective counter-terrorism strategy to be one that destroys enemy capabilities and eradicates safe 
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havens using ‘kinetic’ military force while concurrently halting recruitment and terrorist 
information operations through ‘non-kinetic’ instruments of power.63 His research, which aligns 
with the complex/combined model, offers specific strategy suggestions for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan but also a broader strategy for combating violent extremism on a global scale, which can 
be applied to cases such as Somalia. Hoffman is pragmatic in addressing the practicality behind his 
suggested strategy, explaining that any complex/ combined engagement against terrorist groups 
will lead to a decades’ long involvement in the Middle East region and elsewhere.64 In the 2014 
pivotal article The ‘War on Terrorism’: What Does it Mean to Win?, Audrey Kurth Cronin searches for 
a path toward the ‘successful’ end to the War on Terror. Cronin outlines four patterns customarily 
found in prolonged conflicts: means becoming ends, tactics becoming strategy, boundaries 
becoming blurred, and the search for the perfect peace overcomes reality.65 Cronin goes on to 
criticise the unbound 2001 Authorisation for Use of Military Force (AUMF) as a mechanism that 
provides legitimacy to ongoing counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency campaigns across the 
globe.66 The broad scope and limited restraint of the authorisation has been credited with fortifying 
Washington’s military-industrial complex and allowing for mission objectives to snowball over 
time.  
The terms shadow and proxy war are often used in describing this counter-terrorism strategy. 
Both terms refer to the combination of limited public knowledge, questions of unlawful detention, 
and the manipulation of smaller, more financially dependent nations to fight a battle that is not 
their own.67 Those who most strongly condemn the complex/ combined model, such as Said 
Samatar, view it as neo-colonial and often cite its inappropriate and legally questionable application 
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Determinants of Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
By using the typology to analyse involvement in Somalia, it becomes clear that the United States 
embraced a strategy of complex/combined counter-terrorism toward that country and its terrorist 
activity. As will be discussed in the next chapter, that strategy has developed over time as a result of 
several determining factors. Before assessing the various shifts and consistencies present in that 
counter-terrorism strategy, a review of the determinants that may have affected or influenced the 
chosen U.S. strategy in Somalia require assessment.   
Beyond charting a typology of strategies in counter-terrorism, this dissertation also aims to 
understand the reasoning behind the application of a specific strategy. By identifying and assessing 
determinants of strategy, the justification for a change, shift, or stayed course in strategy is made 
clearer. Just as the typology has shown the four categories of counter-terrorism, there are several 
determinants which affect new U.S. counter-terrorism strategy toward a threat, or act as a catalyst 
to transform a counter-terrorism strategy already underway. These key determinants include 
events, geopolitical conditions, executive or legislative politics, and institutional rivalry. Another 
determinant that will not be reviewed here is the size, relative ability and strength of a terrorist 
organisation. There also exists a fifth determinant: revision.  
When a violent extremist group or associated individual carries out a violent act or attempts 
to carry out a violent act against the U.S., that act is often considered an event which determines, or 
affects, strategic counter-terrorism. Geopolitical conditions that determine counter-terrorism 
strategy can include U.S. relations with neighbouring states, historic economic associations and 
transnational treaties. Domestic politics are often determinants of counter-terrorism strategy. As a 
consequence of the September 11th attacks, the U.S. the executive branch possesses powers that 
enable it to direct military action in counter-terrorism operations, as will later be discussed. As 
such, it is commonly understood that the President can establish broad counter-terrorism policy. 
That being said, the bureaucratic system in place has well established the roles of individual 
departments in directing the type, or category, of strategy applied. Revisionism is related to the 
bureaucratic system in that after a prolonged engagement, a period of evaluation of counter-
terrorism strategy is often initiated by bureaucratic institutions to review the success and/or 
failure of strategic objectives. This determinant is also the most capable of expressing the evolution 
of change and/or consistency of U.S. counter-terrorism strategy toward another country. Before 
delving into the various determinants of counter-terrorism strategy, the next section draws 
attention to relevant historical interventions. This section is included in order to demonstrate 
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patterns of behaviour in countering terrorism and further articulates how revision can be a 
determining factor of strategy.  
Afghanistan: A Comparative Case of Counterterrorism Strategy  
U.S. interventions look different from country to country. Likewise, reasons for intervention differ. 
Nevertheless, U.S. actions taken in Afghanistan and Vietnam are relevant to this investigation of 
counter-terrorism strategy in Somalia. Past engagement in both Afghanistan and Vietnam offer 
imperative historical insight into the way in which determinants can affect U.S. action. The 
historical comparison of engagement in Vietnam and counter-terrorism in Afghanistan 
demonstrate how past campaigns relate to decisions undertaken at present in Somalia, even if 
those conflicts are more characteristic of traditional counter-terrorism strategies. By looking 
backwards at these cases, we can identify determinants which will potentially affect U.S. strategy in 
Somalia moving forward. 
At a conference in 2015, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and Army lieutenant 
general Karl Eikenberry read from The United States in Vietnam, a book written in 1967 by George 
McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis. In the 1960’s the United States intervened in Vietnam in order 
to prevent the spread of communism, commonly known as the domino theory, from North Vietnam 
to South Vietnam.69 Before starting, Eikenberry suggested that the audience substitute each 
historical reference to Vietnam with a more current affair: Afghanistan.  
“Certain of the superiority of their own methods, institutions, and values, and of South Vietnam’s 
(read: Afghanistan) need for help, Americans firmly believed that they knew what was best for their 
client state. They set out to build a modern nation based upon their own model that would be 
invulnerable to communism (read: terrorism) and would demonstrate the magic of the American 
way. However well-intentioned the visitors, cultural arrogance and determination to impose their 
own ways would come across to many South Vietnamese (read: Afghans) as yet another form of 
colonialism from their own history.”  
Eikenberry’s point is not that conflict in Vietnam and Afghanistan are indistinguishable but that U.S. 
involvement in Afghanistan can be measured against its previous actions in Vietnam; actions which 
led to embarrassing withdraw and by some measures defeat. In drawing the comparison, 
Eikenberry demonstrates that each foreign engagement carries a unique history as well as 
teachable moments for future foreign engagements, while also presenting a lack of examination and 
understanding around the factors that lead to divergence in U.S. strategy from country to country.  
The most noticeable divergence between counter-terrorism in Afghanistan or Vietnam and 
that of Somalia is the chosen strategy. Counter-terrorism in Afghanistan and action in Vietnam 
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represent a traditional counter-terrorism strategy in that the engagement manifested as a direct 
military intervention and, in the case of Afghanistan, was followed by a stinted campaign of “hearts 
and minds” state-building.70 In fact, now in its sixteenth year, over two million military personnel 
have been deployed to Afghanistan (and Iraq) in a large scale military intervention.71 In reviewing 
these three countries, the question of why physical intervention and state-building were adopted in 
Vietnam and Afghanistan when the situation in Somalia has been described in similar terms is 
striking.72 For years, the U.S. had worked to maintain a narrow counter-terrorism strategy in 
Somalia, possibly to avoid comparisons to Afghanistan.73 Nonetheless, as time passes comparisons 
continue to be drawn.74 It is within these country comparisons of counter-terrorism strategy that 
we begin to see which factors, or determinants affect strategic decisions.  
Geopolitics as a Determinant of Counter-Terrorism Strategy  
Afghanistan’s neighbours have traditionally created an environment filled with challenging politics. 
Besides countering al-Qaeda in the region, U.S. interests in Afghanistan have been intertwined with 
its dedication to Israel’s state security, halting nuclear proliferation, and maintaining energy 
security. For several decades, the U.S. and its allies were vexed by the Iranian endeavour to develop 
nuclear capability and concerned that success would spur on an arms race in Turkey and Saudi 
Arabia. Furthermore, America was energy dependent upon this region for decades making the 
Persian Gulf of vital economic interest.75 Nonetheless, when comparing engagement in Somalia to 
that in Afghanistan, one must recall that from 2004 onward, the Bush administration was engulfed 
in two wars, which certainly had depleted financial resources and the political willpower to engage 
in another, third international counter-terrorism conflict.    
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Events as a Determinant of Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
The September 11th terrorist attacks are a leading causal factor of Washington’s global counter-
terrorism scope and strategy. Nevertheless, in US Counterterrorism Before bin Laden, Timothy 
Naftali disbands misconceptions that counter-terrorism efforts did not exist prior to 9/11. Instead 
he suggests that the U.S. had prioritised its security apparatus by building up conventional military 
structures and by acting defensively and secretly toward outside threats. Historically, the first U.S. 
efforts to combat terrorism came in the form of domestic security measures following the rise of 
attempted and successful airplane hijackings throughout the 1970’s.76 According to Naftali, it was 
not until the attacks in Vienna and Rome conducted by the Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO) that a 
true counter-terrorism strategy was set into place.77 The Reagan administration did adopt a 
strategy to fight terrorism in the Middle East.78 Even so, it was not until after 9/11 that the face and 
character of warfare was permanently altered and U.S. counter-terrorism transformed into what 
Enders and Sanders describe as an offensive style.79  
Revisionism as a Determinant of Counter-Terrorism Strategy  
Prolonged conflicts often require overseers to revisit strategic objectives and methods of 
engagement. Revisionism is the reassessment of time and funds used in situations where stalemate 
or failure has ensued. This determinant is one which assesses the financial and human cost accrued 
during the course of an enacted strategy. Revision in counter-terrorism strategy has become well-
established over the course of the War on Terror. In Afghanistan, the core objective began with the 
elimination of terrorists associated with bin Laden and sanctuary for terrorist organisations but 
quickly shifted to include the defeat of the Taliban. By 2010, the U.S. shifted its strategy again to one 
that would continue funding but transition conflict responsibility to the Afghanistan authorities.80 
The Obama administration had originally sought to withdraw all combat troops by 2014, yet in 
2017 over 9,000 remain.81 Throughout the war in Afghanistan, troop levels have varied, as have 
strategies of military engagement, as demonstrated in General Stanley McChrystal’s 2009 
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assessment of the war in Afghanistan.82 It seems that in the case of Afghanistan, where revision of 
strategy has taken place, little substantive transformation has occurred.   
Institutional Rivalry in Counter-Terrorism Strategy  
One of the most common methods of categorising U.S. counter-terrorism strategy is through the 
executive role of a certain administration. In fact, Bruce Hoffman, Timothy Naftali, and Thomas 
Badey have all segmented their counter-terrorism research using an administrative viewpoint.83 
This is most likely due to the natural division of policy caused by administration turn over and that 
U.S. presidential candidates are obligated to share their counter-terrorism agenda, making content 
accessible. Nonetheless, within the U.S. government, institutional structures operate with varying 
amounts of autonomy. Another argument against the inflated role of the executive in counter-
terrorism decision-making is the perpetuity of U.S. institutions. According to Hoffman, bureaucratic 
institutions are deeply enmeshed and in a constant state of conflict with each other and sometimes 
the executive branch.84 As such, regardless of executive political power, legacy systems like the 
Central Intelligence Administration (CIA), the State Department, and the Department of Defense 
(DOD) possess strategic power that outlasts any presidential administrations. The role of each of 
these groups in determining strategy will be demonstrated in the coming chapters.   
Whether the U.S. can pivot away from the War on Terror has been debated for several years 
with some blaming the agency-specific perspectives of each bureaucratic institution and publicly 
embedded associations now two decades in the making.85 In Culture, Identity and Hegemony: 
Continuity and (the lack of) Change in US Counter-terrorism Policy from Bush to Obama, Richard 
Jackson questions whether counter-terrorism policy in the U.S. can be rewritten at all after years of 
political practice and culturally embedded identification. Jackson’s 2011 analysis was echoed again 
in 2015 during Karl Eikenberry’s pragmatic assessment of Afghanistan and the future of counter-
terrorism there.  
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 Now that the four types and various determinants of counter-terrorism strategy have been 
identified, and the relevant historical U.S. endeavours mentioned, chapter 3 will focus in on 
terrorist activity in Somalia and early U.S. counter-terrorism in that country.   
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Chapter 3: The Rise of Terrorism and Development of U.S. Counter-Terrorism in Somalia 
A Brief History of Al-Shabaab 
The formation of Harakat al-Shabaab al Mujahidin (Movement of the Striving Youth) known 
commonly as al-Shabaab (The Youth) can be traced back to a loose coalition formed in the early 
2000’s. However, it transformed into a unified group during the rise and subsequent fall of the 
Islamic Courts Union, as has been catalogued by Stig Jarle Hansen’s essential research.86 According 
to Hansen and others, during its rule in southern Somalia, the ICU consisted of both moderate and 
extremist elements, of which the most well-armed and trained eventually came to be al-Shabaab. 
 According to Hansen, Barnes & Hassan, although the ICU was driven from power after only 
a short span, it had gained significant popularity with its ability to enforce law and order.87 When 
the ICU was defeated by Ethiopian forces in early 2007, factions split and intentions shifted.88 Those 
who remained near Mogadishu (mostly the youth league) consolidated al-Shabaab and waged 
guerilla war against Ethiopian forces while others retreated, scattering across the country’s porous 
borders. When Ethiopia withdrew its troops two years later, al-Shabaab quickly gained control over 
the capital and much of southern and central Somalia.89 During that time the group overran the 
positions of African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) forces and gained control over most of 
southern and central Somalia. It was at this point that the Salafi-jihadi group which had previously 
operated on the outer edges of the ICU became globally known as a violent extremist organisation. 
Al-Shabaab used the ‘Christian invasion’ of Ethiopia first and later Ugandan and Burundian AMISOM 
peacekeepers as propaganda to broaden its Islamist appeal across the majority Sunni population. In 
that sense, al-Shabaab was able to exploit historically marginalised populations and generations old 
clan cleavages by stirring up nationalist ideology and religious emotions. Since its inception, the 
group has rejected nationalist calls for a unified Somalia and by using clan frustrations and 
grievances against the ‘corrupt’ Somali government, managed to gain credibility and popularity.90  
Principle beliefs of al-Shabaab revolve around adherence to a strict Sharia rule of law. The 
implementation of Sharia has come in the form of conservative dress codes for women and men, 
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public lashings, beheadings, stoning, and amputation.91 In territories the organisation controlled, 
the stimulant khat became prohibited as did watching sports games and movies, smoking, listening 
to music and other ‘un-Islamic’ behaviour. Al-Shabaab, while Sunni, identifies with the Salafi-
Wahhabism and consider Sufi worship heretical.92 While a majority of the approximately 14 million 
Somali people are Sunni Muslim, many practice the Sufi tradition, putting al-Shabaab at odds with a 
significant portion of the population.93 In fact, al-Shabaab has destroyed graves and material idols 
of Sufi saints and has in the past executed Sufi clerics along with opposition leaders.94  
In August 2011, militants were forced from the capital city by Kenyan and Ethiopian forces. 
Since then, the group has been driven from major strongholds, including ports and several large 
sections of the country that it once controlled. For a time, al-Shabaab remained focused on retaking 
                                                             
91 Stig Jarle Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The history and ideology of a Militant Islamist group, Oxford University Press, 
2013. 
92 Roland, Marchal, "A tentative assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab," Journal of Eastern African Studies 3, no. 3 
(2009): 381-404. 
93 World Bank, 2016.  
94 Abdi Sheikh, “Shabaab rebels destroy graves and mosque in Somalia,” Reuters, October 19, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-conflict/shabaab-rebels-destroy-grave-and-mosque-in-somalia-
idUSTRE59I1HQ20091019 
Figure 1: Somalia Control Map August 2017 
32 
 
Mogadishu but it has recently shifted tactics and works instead on expanding its rural presence, 
often launching guerilla operations and suicide bombings on AMISOM military bases and across the 
border in Kenya.95 In 2016, al-Shabaab regained some territory after Ethiopian forces withdrew 
from Somalia. Today, the group continues its attacks on AMISOM bases, the Federal Government of 
Somalia (FGS), and the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF).96 Al-Shabaab killed more than 4,000 
people in 2016 alone and in the first half of 2017 the Africa Center for Strategic Studies associated 
1,831 fatalities with the group.97 Recent attacks like the October truck bombings, which killed over 
500 people, make clear that the terrorist group is purposefully targeting both civilian and military 
Somalis. The number of AMISOM troop casualties remains unknown as individual countries have 
been taciturn in reporting losses. From February 2017 the terrorist group ramped up attacks in 
Mogadishu following presidential elections. In the days following the election, the group used a 
truck filled with explosives to kill 39 people near a market in Mogadishu.  On June 8, al-Shabaab 
killing approximately 70 Somali troops at a military base in Puntland.98 Al-Shabaab also claimed 
responsibility for detonating a car bomb and attacked civilians inside a Mogadishu restaurant, 
killing at least 31 in late June 2017.99 
 Successes against al-Shabaab are measurable. The group has lost territory, financing, popular 
support and fighting strength since 2009.100 While each loss of al-Shabaab is a victory for the U.S. 
and Somali governments, there is growing competition as different terrorist and insurgent groups, 
like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), move into the country. 101 For now, al-Shabaab 
remains intact but has split into numerous factions, having never been ideologically or politically 
homogenous. The fractures began around July 2010, when Ahmad Abdi Godane and Hassan 
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Abdullah Hersi al-Turki (commander of the Kamboni militia and former commander of ICU) joined 
forces and pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda.102 Since then, there have been additional splits with 
factions pledging support to the Islamic State, which has increased its presence in Puntland and 
other parts of the country in recent years, while others maintain allegiance to al-Qaeda. For now, 
Sheikh Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah, al-Shabaab’s current leader is continuing with the allegiance to 
and collaborations with al-Qaeda.  
While the ideological struggle continues, the Somali government struggles to provide basic 
services to its population and achieve legitimacy as a governing body. Political progress remains 
shaky. Regional and international partners have grown weary from years of intangible progress and 
AMISOM support has stalled both politically and financially. In recent months, the diverging 
strategies of U.S. counter-terrorism and Somali counterinsurgency have displayed stark differences. 
For instance, in July and August of 2017 an American drone strike killed high level al-Shabaab 
official Ali Mohamed ‘Ali Jabal’ Hussein while Mukhtar Rabow, known as ‘Abu Mansur’, a former 
spokesperson and deputy military commander of al-Shabaab defected to the FGS months after 
President Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Farmajo’ Mohamed declared amnesty to those who surrender.103  
Defining Terrorism  
In order to assess methods of counter-terrorism against al-Shabaab, we must first ensure an 
understanding of internationally recognized acts of terrorism. Authors like Ishrat Abbasi and 
Mukesh Kumar Khatwani have outlined the political and religious histories of ancient terrorism as 
well as the relationship between acts of terrorism and theories of anarchism, fascism, and anti-
colonialism.104  
Oxford English Dictionary states that the word 'terrorist' (French: terroriste) was invented 
in the year 1794, during the French Revolution. The first meaning of the word 'terrorist' was 
applied then to supporters of the Jacobins. Recorded usage of the word climbed slowly from the 
early 20th century through the 1960s until a noticeable spike occurred in the 1970’s, when both 
‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’ usage in the English language rose significantly. One aspect of this 
dissertation will be to assess the impact of events in determining counter-terrorism strategy. Table 
1 depicts several spikes in the usage of terminology relating to terrorism, which may in turn be 
related to events. It is possible that the first spike in usage of ‘terrorism’ is related to the September 
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1970 airplane hijackings conducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). 105 
The phrase ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ only came into use in the 1980’s. In 1985 the Abu Nidal 
organisation (ANO) hijacked an EgyptAir flight, which resulting in the death of 59 people. One 
month later, ANO militants attacked civilians in airports in Vienna and Rome. The table below links 
language use to events, affirming the relevance of events as relevant determinants of counter-
terrorism strategy.  
 
Table 2: The Role of Events in Use of Language Associated with 'Terrorism'106 
 
In Terrorism and Africa, Jakkie Cilliers reveals how definitions of terrorist action crafted by 
governments and international organisations tend to use prescriptive language which disregards 
notions of structural inequality and other causal mechanisms that might lead one to violence.107  At 
its heart, the debate revolves around whether or not terrorism is rational action, as studied by 
Robert Pape (2003) and others. On this point, some academics adhere to conventional definitions, 
while others debate the importance of external factors in defining actors and their actions. For 
instance, Max Abrahms views terrorism plainly as “groups that attack civilians to coerce their 
government into making concessions,”108 while Martha Crenshaw, Cind Du Bois and Caroline Buts 
embrace more comprehensive definitions to include environments which might affect behaviour. In 
contrast to Abrahms, Crenshaw believes that the use of human violence and physical destruction is 
not always an objective but more aptly described as a tool to gain and hold audience attention.109  
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 The United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as the purposeful use of illegal 
violence or the threat to instill fear, generally against civilians, usually by nongovernmental actors, in 
order to coerce governments in the pursuit of ideological, religious or political goals.110 The 
Department of State defines terrorism in the preamble to Title 22 of the U.S. Code Section 2656f(d) 
as ‘premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-
national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.’111 Furthermore, the 
State Department includes the following actions in its definition of ‘terrorist activity’: 
(I) The hijacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle). 
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another individual 
in order to compel a third person (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from 
doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or detained. 
(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined in section 1116(b)(4) of 
title 18, United States Code) or upon the liberty of such a person. 
(IV) An assassination. 
(V) The use of any- 
(aa) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or 
(bb) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal 
monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more 
individuals or to cause substantial damage to property. 
(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.112 
 
The United Nations (UN) has been unable to facilitate consensus on a definition of terrorism 
due to the broad political nature of its signatory parties. The informal text as it exists in Article 2 of 
the Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism currently embraces the following: causing death or serious 
bodily injury to a person, destruction of public or private property including state or government 
facilities, and/ or destruction with the intended result of major economic loss, or intimidation of a 
population, government or international organization to compel said organisation or government to 
obtain from doing any act.113 Noticeably, the informal UN definition omits emotive language and any 
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Defining Counterterrorism  
Broadly speaking, counter-terrorism is any political or military activity designed to prevent or 
thwart terrorism.114 The most explicit point to be made in understanding the difference between 
counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency is this: The FGS, with assistance from AMISOM, is 
immersed in a counterinsurgency campaign against al-Shabaab. The United States on the other 
hand, is engaged only in counter-terrorism against that same group. Although similar, scope and 
resources allocated to the mission are the primary differences between these two terms, which 
have been used interchangeably over the years.115 
While it has been unable to move forward with a binding definition of terrorism, the UN has 
made progress in crafting its strategic and operational approach to countering terrorism. In 2006, 
the UN unanimously adopted a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which outlines four expert areas 
of focus: addressing the conditions conductive to the spread of terrorism, preventing and 
combating terrorism, building states’ capacity and strengthening the role of the United Nations, and 
ensuring human rights and the rule of law.116 
The U.S. counter-terrorism typology illustrates the conceptual selection of strategies 
available in undertaking counter-terrorism measures toward another state. Historical analysis of 
the conflict in Somalia provides an environmental framework for understanding why counter-
terrorism is required in the country. Next, this dissertation will apply the typology and 
determinants to understand the evolution of counter-terrorism in Somalia; where the United States 
has been and is currently involved in operations.  
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The Development of Early Counter-terrorism Strategy in Somalia 
Events and political decision-making had an effect on U.S. counter-terrorism strategy in Somalia 
early on. Following the attacks on September 11, 2011, public and political support for aggressive 
counter-terrorism expanded. 9/11 of course represents an event which helped determine counter-
terrorism policy and strategy for many years. The moment that connections between Islam, 
religious violent extremism, and Somalia were drawn they could not be erased. But in fact, U.S. 
administrations dating back to the early days of the Clinton presidency had perceived Somalia as a 
haven and training location for al-Qaeda affiliates.117 In 1993 al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden took 
credit for supplying the sophisticated weapons used to shoot down American Black Hawk 
helicopters in Mogadishu.118 That early association made between terrorism and Somalia would 
remain a shadow over U.S. policy toward the country for a decade and beyond as the administration 
of President George W. Bush pursued an incoherent counter-terrorism course of action that would 
exacerbate the civil conflict underway and deepen already tenuous mistrust for western alliances 
amongst Somalis. In 2004, the U.S. and international community attempted to fashion together a 
central government to engender some form of domestic stability. The result was the Transitional 
Federal Government, which would later be transformed into a political paper tiger and propaganda 
target for the ICU and nascent al-Shabaab.119 
Islamic Courts Union  
By 2006, Islamic clerics and Somali business-people had solidified the Islamic Court Union. The 
clerics had gained autonomy a few years previous when they had organised former members of Al-
Itihad al-Islamiya, an early iteration of al-Shabaab, and other sympathisers into a militia that 
enforced the court rules and apprehended criminals in certain territories.120 The ICU elected former 
Al-Itihad al-Islamiya leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, a controversial figure, to the role of 
President. From within the political apparatus of the ICU, its militia, and a war-wary population, 
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Aweys was able to gain control over the southern part of the country.121 While western society 
generally views Sharia as a harsh, inhumane and repressive system of law, Somalis found peace and 
security in the ICU and accepted its tough legal procedures because for once, it was safe. As such, 
Sharia may not have been a democratic system, but it was one that created social, economic and 
governmental structures that allowed for some of the stability that many Somali’s desperately 
wanted.122 The Islamist ideology adhered to by al-Shabaab, known as Salafi-Wahhabism or Salafi-
Jihadism did exist within the ICU but that extreme religious ideology was also mediated by 
moderate voices.123 In reality, like Islam itself, the ICU was multifaceted.  
Nevertheless, that did not stop western media and government officials from repeatedly 
calling the ICU, “Africa’s Taliban”.124 Washington had branded the ICU without learning about the 
complex relationships between Islamic clerics within the organization.  According to President 
Farmajo, Washington missed a great opportunity during this period to recognize these differences 
in choosing its words and actions accordingly. Farmajo explains that, “by branding the entire ICU as 
“terrorist,” the U.S. alienated Somali Muslims in general and forged a much greater enemy in the 
process.”125 Somali expert Ken Menkhaus, called the decision to back and assist in the overthrow of 
the ICU, “worse than the worst-case scenarios – the exact opposite of what the US government 
strategy, if there was one, would have wanted”.126 Following the rise of the ICU, between 2005 and 
2007, the U.S. publicly supported, “the establishment of a functioning government that incorporates 
all elements of Somali society, including religious leaders and Islamic organisations, the business 
community, civil society, and women’s groups”.127 From June 2006 onward, Washington spent 
months calling for an ‘inclusive’ political solution in Somalia. The State department stressed the 
need for inclusive dialogue based on broad-based representation from Somali society to achieve 
these objectives. State department representatives publicly (and ironically) cited force of arms as 
an ineffective means of resolving the country’s challenges.128 But it became increasingly clear that 
the solution for the United States would have to be one that did not include the ICU. This was less 
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than five months before Ethiopia invaded Somalia at the behest and paycheck of the U.S. 
government officials with 50,000 troops.129 By July 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was 
convinced that Islamic hardliners controlled, or were about to take control of, the ICU. Secretary 
Rice believed that hardliners would almost certainly subvert negotiations with the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG), enact Sharia law and religious social policies, create a safe haven for al-
Qaeda operatives in Mogadishu, and present a hostile foreign policy oriented to regional 
neighbours like Ethiopia and Kenya. 130 At this point, U.S. strategy toward Somalia shifted to become 
more involved in the threats growing there. While it remains unclear what exactly caused the 
change in strategy, there were a few notable determinant factors.  
Institutional Rivalry in Early Counter-Terrorism Strategy  
During the early days of U.S. counter-terrorism in Somalia the American intelligence community 
(IC) became increasingly concerned with the spread of what it identified as radical Islamic ideology. 
The IC took separate action to enroll local Somali militia leaders in operations to capture al-Qaeda 
operatives who were active in the country. In February 2006, these militia groups formed the 
Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT). The CIA was secretly 
funneling between $100,000 and $150,000 to amenable warlords and businessmen who joined the 
partnership during this time.131 Just as early alliances with the Taliban in Afghanistan were 
overlooked during the Cold War, recruitment of militia and clan leaders in Somalia and their 
historical human rights violations and prior in-discrepancies toward democratic idealism were 
overlooked. The strategic objective at the time was to bring together a central government to create 
some basis for legal and political institutions.  
Just as in the case of Afghanistan, early U.S. objectives in Somalia may have been clear but 
the methodological differences used by the CIA and State Department to accomplish what they each 
perceived to be strategic objectives demonstrated bureaucratic miscommunication. The CIA 
focused on achieving security through clandestine operations aimed at gathering information that 
would lead to the capture of al-Qaeda operatives while the State Department attempted to mitigate 
the internal conflict through mediation, diplomacy, and aid. Unfortunately, in supporting the CIA 
initiative, Washington misread the Somali population, as they had in the 1990’s, and the secret 
backing of militias failed. Backlash against foreign efforts and self-serving militias led to the joining 
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together of clan and religious leaders, businessmen and the only remaining system of law and 
order, the Sharia courts, to create the ICU. Following the CIA/ARPCT alliance debacle, the State 
Department wrestled control away from the CIA and became more involved in guiding strategy in 
Somalia.132  
Revisionism in Early Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
The continuing clash between military and political decision-making is one worth noting. Stephen 
Emerson outlines several characteristics relevant to post-2009 counter-terrorism strategy toward 
al-Shabaab which he believes indicate an increased reliance on military power that indicate a 
repetition of Cold War politics. Emerson highlights the imbalance between military and civilian 
resources in counter-terrorism strategy and the acceptance of what he considers the ‘Algerian 
Approach’ which can be summarized as a hard power application of complex/ combined strategy.133 
This argument aligns with the evidence brought forward thus far within this dissertation as it 
relates to the hardening of complex/combined counter-terrorism over the last decade.  
In December 2006, Ethiopia invaded Somalia with the intention to overthrow the ICU and 
withdraw within weeks. Upon first glance, Ethiopia’s early operation in Somalia could seem like a 
traditional counter-terrorism strategy that used direct military engagement. But Ethiopia had 
succeeded in gaining regional dominance over its neighbors in part due to its partnership with the 
U.S. The country’s relative stability and primarily Christian population has made it a valuable 
regional ally for America, especially in its War on Terror. As such, Ethiopia was actually a proxy 
state, using by the U.S. in its complex/combined counter-terrorism operation against al-Shabaab in 
exchange for financing, aid and tactical support.134 The invasion was operationally and tactically 
supported by the Bush administration. Ethiopia had planned on withdrawing as soon as the ICU 
was crushed for fear of becoming stymied in Mogadishu. However, the TFG was extraordinarily 
weak and the city remained hostile. At this point, the U.S. pledged $100 million to enforcing the 
Somali government.135 However, after only two weeks of occupation by Ethiopian forces and TFG 
governance in Mogadishu clan militias and warlord militias had formed a ‘complex insurgency’ 
coalition. The combination of a stronger than expected insurgence and an aggressive military 
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reaction from Ethiopian troops led to the proposal of 8,000 AU peacekeepers to establish and 
maintain security. However, at that time only Uganda committed troops, forcing Ethiopia to commit 
to re-stabilizing its neighbour instead of withdrawing as originally intended.136  
It is important to recall that around this time, United States operations were officially 
targeting only al-Qaeda militants operating in Somalia. It would be more than a year before Al-
Shabaab would be designated as a foreign terror organisation.  
Geopolitics in Early Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
Early U.S. involvement proved counterproductive. From 2006 to 2007, the United States led in 
global assistance to Somalia with more than $156 million USD.137  While humanitarian assistance is 
a component of the state-building strategy of counter-terrorism, that aid was not specifically linked 
to countering terrorists or terrorism and more accurately represented a general aid package given 
to any developing country, regardless of the presence of violent extremism. Thus, early engagement 
does not support the state-building category of counter-terrorism strategy. Another argument 
against the state-building strategy is the tactical decision to focus on covert action.  The Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been acting unilaterally to expand the powers of non-ICU militia 
groups in the country for several years. In retrospect, CIA-led operations were most likely the least 
costly and most effective option for containing the post invasion violence in Somalia. However, 
covert operations fail to uphold democratic principles often associated with western democracies 
and state-building counter-terrorism strategies. In general, U.S. strategic decisions around this time 
focused on gathered intelligence and investigating the growing presence of al-Qaeda in Somalia and 
not on the growing occurrence of smaller militia groups.138 We can assume that allowing al-Qaeda 
sanctuary was the primary concern for American counter-terrorism efforts given the nascent 
development of al-Shabaab. However, the primary reason for U.S. involvement according to 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Fraser, culminated when the ICU refused to 
recognise the U.S. and Ethiopian supported transitional government, electing for a militarily 
enforced expansion of power.139 Domestic infighting, chaos and turmoil of Somalia were not 
primary determinants for U.S. re-engagement. Rather, it was the threat of an Islamic government in 
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a strategic region that facilitated American and Ethiopian intervention in Somalia. Effectively, early 
intervention was determined by an event – the military expansion of the ICU – in combination with 
the geopolitical threat associated with that event.  
Political Response to the Rise of al-Shabaab  
Secretary Rice was in fact correct about the expansion policy undertaken by the ICU. The second 
half of 2006 was marked by the consolidation of territory and implementation of Sharia law across 
southern Somalia by ICU militants. The ICU also increased its public diatribes against not only the 
West but also regional neighbors Kenya and Ethiopia.140 However, to this day it remains unclear to 
what extent the extremist elements within the ICU controlled policy and which members acted of 
their own volition. Significant chunks of American literature from the early days of ICU’s rule 
contend that the voice of al-Shabaab was rapidly rising, while later analyses maintain less certain, 
more critical tones.141 In any case, at that time Washington viewed the military expansion and 
movement of ICU militia toward the seat of the TFG in Baidoa as a major threat and publicly 
encouraged dialogue between the two groups.142 Privately, the Americans were already working to 
address their concerns with regional partners.143  
What happened next was a diplomatic flip-flop. At first, Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer 
travelled to the region to press for a diplomatic solution to the TFG-ICU stand-off and sought to 
forge working relations with moderate Islamists.144 Meanwhile, the military and other agencies 
began to focus on the unfolding situation increasingly as a high-level security threat.145 Countering 
terrorist threats and securing regional interests quickly became priority and creating a more 
comprehensive, diplomacy-driven solution to address the political and social challenges in Somalia 
fell by the wayside. Additionally, diplomatic attempts went unaided by the ICU, which remained 
unwilling to negotiate with the TFG, and ultimately dismissive and derisive toward what it 
considered to be a western proxy.  By late 2006, a noticeable shift in tone from U.S. officials 
indicated a permanent strategic hardening. Assistant Secretary Frazer told reporters on December 
14th that, “The Council of Islamic Courts is now controlled by al-Qaeda cell individuals, East Africa 
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al-Qaeda cell individuals,” and “(the) top layer of the courts are extremist to the core.”146 Again, the 
Bush administration maintained that its stance was a direct reaction to military aggression from the 
ICU.  
The shift away from finding a diplomatic solution could also be linked to Ethiopia’s 
geopolitical interest in a more engaged U.S. counter-terrorism policy throughout the region. At the 
time of its invasion into Somalia, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi claimed that “Ethiopian 
defense forces were forced to enter into war to protect the sovereignty of the nation. We are not 
trying to set up a government for Somalia, nor do we have an intention to meddle in Somalia’s 
internal affairs. We have only been forced by the circumstances.”147 While the United States linked 
the ICU to al-Qaeda and supported the invasion in furtherance of its War on Terror, Ethiopia found 
its justification in liberating the Somali nation from insurgents in order to create security at home 
and along the border. The two countries have a long history of contested territories perpetuated by 
arbitrary nation-state divisions drawn under colonial rule.148 Another worry was the not 
insignificant Muslim population in Ethiopia and its reaction to a neighboring Islamic state. Internal 
insurgencies such as the Oromo Liberation Front and Ogaden National Liberation Front became 
inflamed during this time and violent extremists traveling from Eritrea made regional and national 
destabilisation a true concern for Ethiopia.”149  
Frazer’s public transformation was in some ways the “green light” for Ethiopia to attack, 
signaling the political resolve of Washington to back the Ethiopian invasion. Ethiopia, a 
predominantly Christian country with generations of antagonistic relations with Somalia, was 
perfectly situated to act as proxy for preventing the Islamist union from consolidating its power. 
The irony of the Ethiopian invasion and U.S. reservations toward radical elements of the ICU is that 
by 2009 the TFG ratified legislation to implement Sharia law in a failed attempt to consolidate its 
loose hold on power.  
Around the time that State Department officials began hardening their strategy toward the 
ICU, American officials at the United Nations pushed through UN Security Council Resolution 1725, 
which effectively protected the Ethiopian government from facing charges of violating the arms 
embargo of 1992 once its forces crossed into Somalia.150 The partial lift allowed Intergovernmental 
Authority for Development (IGAD) and AU members to intervene with military force in order to 
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protect the TFG and to arm and train TFG security forces. Two months later, the embargo was 
revised once again to sanction weapons supplies and equipment to cross into Somalia.151 As part of 
the UN Security Council, the United States could sanction the invasion of its conscripted regional 
power into Somalia while gaining approval from the international community to arm those willing 
to fight against the ICU. Strategically, this method of engagement cannot be considered direct but 
proved to be a diplomatically aggressive manifestation of previous non-military actions. Effectively, 
Washington forced its desired outcomes using international political institutions and 





                                                             




Defining Early U.S. Counter-terrorism Strategy in Somalia 
It wasn’t until the events of 9/11 and subsequent intelligence which reported the presence of al-
Qaeda in Somalia that the United States became actively involved. The U.S. paid little attention to a 
decades-long humanitarian crisis, anarchy, and lawlessness in Somalia; all conditions which can be 
linked to radicalisation.152 It failed early on to engage the ICU or to initially learn about the complex 
Somali social network, suggesting that a population-centered counter-terrorism strategy had never 
been the driver behind its actions. The diplomatic relations detailed above demonstrate that state-
building counter-terrorism was not the preferred strategy. Neither do early U.S. counter-terrorism 
strategies speak to traditional counter-terrorism. Criminal justice counter-terrorism was not an 
available option, given the lack of clear, or internationally accepted, domestic institutions. 
Therefore, the only available description of early U.S. counter-terrorism strategy is complex/ 
combined counter-terrorism.  
However, if it were possible to map depth of engagement within a specific strategy, the 
early clandestine, funding, and political maneuvering to prevent the rise of the ICU and to eliminate 
al-Qaeda operatives would fall on the low end of the complex/combined spectrum. In fact, U.S. 
involvement in Somalia from 2006-2009 should be considered the first iteration of a long and 
evolving strategy of complex/ combined counter-terrorism. To minimise the American footprint 
abroad and investment in foreign conflicts while allowing for the flexibility to take action against 
potential threats to U.S. security, President Bush adopted a counter-terrorism strategy in Somalia 
that allowed for extremely limited action, with almost no direct action at all. Instead, the 
administration chose to embrace Ethiopia as an effective proxy for U.S. interests. What little direct 
engagement did exist during this time was conducted through clandestine operations using 
intelligence assessments or Ethiopian allies to target senior al-Qaeda operatives.153 This strategy 
operated on the belief that by eliminating high level operatives the movement would be crippled 
and recruitment would be dissuaded. The early strategy was effective in achieving short term 
outcomes based on the application of minimum effort, but it diminished American credibility 
abroad and drew significant criticism for human rights violations. To that point, allegations of 
secret detention and rendition collaborations fed suspicions and called to question whether 
complex/combined action in counter-terrorism is capable of upholding democratic principles. One 
person captured by special operations during the Bush administration was Suleiman Abdullah, a 
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Tanzanian fisherman mistakenly identified as a terrorist suspect. Abdullah was only released after 
five years of detention without charge.154   
Early in 2007, believing it had actionable intelligence on the whereabouts of several high 
level al-Qaeda officials, the U.S. military approved airstrikes on a convoy moving through the 
southern part of the country. The strike killed nine al-Shabaab militants but not one member of al-
Qaeda. These airstrikes created evidence for Somalis and confirmed to the international community 
that the U.S. was working closely with the TFG and Ethiopia in its counter-terrorism campaign. 
Assistant Secretary Frazer later explained that the decision to carry out the airstrike, “fed 
suspicions of U.S. intentions, motives and commitment to long-term stability” in the region.155 In 
2008, the leader and founder of al-Shabaab, Aden Hashi Farah, was killed in an airstrike. The death 
of Farah marked the official inclusion of al-Shabaab into the U.S. mandate of counter-terrorism in 
Somalia. This instance represents the turning point for U.S. operations in the country. If the success 
and positive reception to the ICU had frightened the West to action, a more powerful and growing 
al-Shabaab was considerably more concerning. It was at this point that a previously loose strategy 
which leaned toward containment transformed across the spectrum into a more involved and 
developed version of complex/ combined counter-terrorism. And that strategy included a clear 
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Chapter 4: Shifting Complex/ Combined Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Somalia 
 
By the time Barack Obama took office, the situation in Somalia had deteriorated and counter-
terrorism operations were not achieving desired outcomes. After the ICU was defeated, it split into 
three groups: The Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam.156 
All of these groups had been fighting against Ethiopian troops and the TFG. On January 26, 2009, 
the last convoys of Ethiopian troops departed the country and almost instantly the local clan militia 
looted vacated bases. It wasn’t long before al-Shabaab retook Mogadishu and much of Southern and 
Central Somalia including the headquarters of the TFG in Baidoa. The TFG was left a shell, viewed 
merely as a western proxy aligned with Ethiopian forces and needed to foment legitimacy and 
partnerships to survive. Around this time, a power sharing agreement between the Alliance for the 
Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS-Djibouti) and the TFG was signed as part of the UN Security Council 
sanctioned Djibouti Peace Process and former ICU and ARS-Djibouti leader Sheikh Sharif Sheikh 
Ahmed took up the role of President in March 2009.157 In attempts to satisfy its coalition partners, 
the TFG adopted Sharia law, one of the fundamental reservations that caused the invasion, into the 
preliminary constitution. That the international community, including the U.S., conformed to a 
power sharing agreement between the TFG and the ARS-Djibouti, which was merely a fragmented 
group originally part of the ICU, suggests that violence had escalated and the TFG was incapable of 
achieving domestic control over its constituency or supporting U.S. counter-terrorism objectives.  
That the U.S. would work with an institution that had adopted Sharia, one of its primary concerns 
during the early days of the conflict, demonstrates early revision, a determinant of U.S. policy 
toward Somalia.   
Officially, the Obama administration’s U.S. foreign policy objectives in Somalia continued to 
promote political and economic stability while preventing the use of Somalia as a haven for 
international terrorism and alleviating the ongoing humanitarian crisis.158 Outwardly, these policy 
objectives were enforced by the State Department's commitment to strengthen the country’s 
democratic institutions, improve security and stability, and to increase the delivery of services for 
the Somali people. Complex/combined counter-terrorism is generally reliant upon intelligence and 
viewed as inexpensive compared to traditional counter-terrorism. It limits the involvement of the 
adopting state in nation-building and keeps the public uninformed of U.S. actions, making it an ideal 
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option for unpopular foreign engagements. It also prevents loss of U.S. military lives, making it a 
stable option for combating terrorism overseas. However, between the withdrawal of Ethiopian 
troops, the distribution of a video showing Al-Qaeda training camps in Somalia calling for 
foreigners to join in the jihad, and the rising power of al-Shabaab militia groups, U.S. official 
counter-terrorism strategy shifted significantly.159 The official U.S. designation of al-Shabaab as a 
foreign terror organisation meant that the United States considered the group to be a security 
threat to itself and its allies.160 The official designation also translated into a guideline for action. 
President Obama legally expanded the previous administration's procedures for ‘limited direct 
action’ from targeting only al-Qaeda leadership in Somalia to include senior al-Shabaab 
operatives.161 That rule was later amended for a third time to include mid and low-level 
operatives.162 In September 2009, a U.S. Navy SEAL helicopter raid killed al-Qaeda leader Saleh Ali 
Saleh al Nabhan, wanted for his role in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings. By 2016, U.S. airstrikes 
would be targeting low level al-Shabaab fighters.163 The ground offensive was refocused from al-
Qaeda to al-Shabaab and expanded its military footprint from clandestine operations to include 
strikes using drones and Special Forces.164 These tactics are primary characteristics of 
complex/combined counter-terrorism. The Bush administration has been portrayed by history as 
aggressively militant in its foreign policy but it was the Obama administration that began and 
became heavily reliant upon drones, airstrikes and special operations in its counter-terrorism.165 
From 2011 to 2017, the Obama administration undertook 29 drone strikes in Somalia, killing 309 
people, recording 5 civilian casualties.166 Cronin and Byman have both researched the substitution 
of drones and special operations units as methods used to prevent ground troop involvement in the 
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Horn of Africa.167 Their argument aligns with complex/ combined counter-terrorism used by the 
Obama administration from 2009 to 2017.   
One of the most significant shifts in counter-terrorism strategy objectives undertaken in 
Somalia has been the decision to grow military and security capacity through funding and training. 
The strategy in Somalia has always been based on decision-making from a distance, with the United 
States trying to determine outcomes without being overtly involved in the conflict. However, there 
have been certain events, such as increased piracy off the coast and deadly al-Shabaab attacks in 
Kenya which demanded U.S. reassessment of its involvement. The wax and wane of al-Shabaab’s 
man-power and ability to conduct terror is also closely related to any revision in U.S. counter-
terrorism strategy. For instance, as was the case in Afghanistan, the US, UN and allies have recently 
shifted focus to strengthening and training the Somali National Security Force. Currently, the U.S. is 
assisting in some portion of compensation dispensed to Somali troops.168 Throughout the second 
term of the Obama administration a revolving door of CIA and U.S. Special Forces personnel were 
deployed to Somalia to train security forces. Those forces helped to train Somalia’s Gashaan 
(“lightning”) Special Forces unit. Today that brigade remains small but effective, accompanying U.S. 
Special Forces on missions. In fact, Gashaan has been charged with the protection of President 
Farmajo.169 While the elite operations team is one example of a successful training operation, 
protecting the entire country is beyond its scope. The larger, national security force has struggled 
since 2012 to grow its capabilities. The army is chronically underfunded, and its troops remain ill-
prepared for combat roles.  The focus on strengthening Somali forces constitutes a shift in strategy 
and is most likely explained by the conclusion of the AMISOM forces mandate. If AMISOM 
withdraws and the Somali National Security Force remains unable to combat al-Shabaab and bring 
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Geopolitical Determinants Affect the Complex/ Combined U.S. Counter-terrorism Strategy 
U.S. funding demonstrates the role of institutions in determining strategy, as well the type of U.S. 
counter-terrorism strategy applied to Somalia. Figure 2 demonstrates the Bush administration 
military spending in Somalia accounted for approximately 5 percent of aid while the Obama 
administration military budget for the country metastasized to nearly 40 percent of aid.170 As costs 
increased, so did counter-terrorism tactics. In 2011, President Obama authorised the use of UAV 
Predator drones in Somalia to target high level al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab operatives.171 Proponents 
of drone use in counter-terrorism operations, like Daniel Byman, claim that given the intense 
security situation in Somalia at the time, alternative tactics would have required a bulkier footprint 
of American soldiers in the region. By 2010, Camp Lemonnier, the first permanent U.S. military 
installation moved onto African soil, had become the hub for drone activity in Africa and parts of 
the Middle East.172 A 2016 study highlights the shift of physical military U.S. occupancy into the 
Horn of Africa as the transition from soft military presence to one of increased military strength.173  
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Besides increased reliance on drones and military might, counter-terrorism strategy shifted 
to direct funding for nations willing to partner in counter-terrorism operations. In its increased 
support for international partners in the fight against al-Shabaab, the U.S. promoted ‘cooperative 
intervention’ and publicly pivoted toward an internationally financed model for counter-terrorism 
operations.174 With the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces in 2009 came the establishment of the 
African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and creation of the Partnership for Regional East 
African Counterterrorism (PREACT) as well as a permanent U.S. military base in Djibouti and the 
extension of the UN humanitarian mission in Somalia (UNSOM).175 AMISOM took over with the 
mandate to provide security, to enable stabilization of the political process, and to conduct 
offensive operations against al-Shabaab.176 However, from 2007 to 2016 UNSOM and AMISOM 
forces received nearly $1 billion from the U.S.  
As further evidence of the financial lengths the government would go to, between 2007 and 
2009 alone Washington paid $135 million for ‘logistical and equipment support and pre-
deployment training’ for Burundian and Ugandan forces operating in Somalia.177 In any case, these 
training courses and exercises could be aiding in the strength and defense capacity of African 
regional partners. Washington began feeding defense funding and aid to regional allies Kenya and 
Ethiopia. Kenyan police and security forces began traveling to the U.S. for counter-terrorism 
training with the Federal Bureau of Investigations and other agencies in 2002.178 The venture was 
paid for by the American government and would be the start of a lasting counter-terrorism 
relationship between the two nations. For a period of time, Kenyan ports and airfields were used by 
the U.S. to conduct exercises throughout the region.179 As a regional ally, Kenya has grown its roll 
over the last decade. By 2012, al-Shabaab was receding, having lost territory and momentum in 
Somalia. The violent extremist organisation was forced to reevaluate its strategy and refocus efforts 
on less protected neighboring countries. Al-Shabaab's shift in tactical focus to Northern Kenya 
created significant political and security challenges. In 2013, the Westgate Mall was attacked and in 
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2015 over one hundred and fifty people were killed at Garissa University. Both events affected 
domestic and U.S. counter-terrorism strategy. Besides the major attacks at Garissa University and 
Westgate Mall, al-Shabaab began conducting guerrilla attacks on AMISOM bases and ‘seize and 
sermon’ recruitment style missions along the Kenyan border to indoctrinate Kenyan nationals.180 
The technique is not unfounded, as evangelising against government corruption is one way that al-
Shabaab rose to power in Somalia. These attacks present the extremist organisations resilience and 
renewed focus to wait out the enemy. In 2005, al-Shabaab consisted of around 30 fighters, averaged 
less than 1 attack per month and controlled very little to no area of Somalia. Between 2011 and 
2016, fighters ranged between 3000 and 8000 and averaged 71 terrorist attacks per month.181 
During both periods, organisational cohesion was low, but al-Shabaab continued in its ability to 
cause significant harm and maintain a strong support base. For Kenya, cross-border operations, 
targeting, and recruitment of Muslim Kenyans have made the country’s involvement in AMISOM 
and the War on Terror very unpopular and some blame the military intervention in Somalia as the 
cause for al-Shabaab’s increased and deadly attacks inside of Kenya.182 There is growing concern 
that Kenya’s commitment to fighting al-Shabaab will nurture instability in rural parts of the 
country. To further compound floundering political interest in combating al-Shabaab, domestic 
disputes and social unrest relating to elections have added to calls for Kenyan forces to be returned 
home.  
Revisionism in U.S. Counter-terrorism Strategy toward Somalia 
As previously mentioned, the increase of AMISOM forces, flow of funds to fight terrorism and 
internal fighting within al-Shabaab stymied the group's ability to affect chaos for a period. So much 
so that by 2015, while speaking at a Senate hearing in Washington, Director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center Nicholas Rasmussen made a pronouncement which would have lasting 
implications for the Obama and Trump administration's counter-terrorism strategy toward al-
Shabaab. Rasmussen explained that the group, “continues to threaten U.S. interests in East Africa” 
saying that the organisation represents “a potential threat to the Homeland” because some (al-
Shabaab) leaders had, in the past, publicly called for transnational attacks against the U.S. but 
overall the interest of al-Shabaab “appear(s) to still be primarily focused on operations in East 
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Africa.”183 Rasmussen’s statement put forward for consideration the improbable reality of an attack 
conducted by al-Shabaab on American territory and stated that the organisation was not a direct 
threat to American security. The following year, that U.S. aid to Somalia dropped from $402 million 
in 2014 to $255 million and the distribution of aid to military funding plummeted cannot be 
overlooked.184 On May 23rd 2013, the Obama administration renounced the War on Terror, saying 
that military and intelligence operations would no longer wage war on a tactic but instead would 
focus on groups specifically determined to destroy the U.S.185 Al-Shabaab would no longer be 
prioritized in the fight against terrorism which meant the redistribution of resources and yet 
another shift in strategy. 
 Misunderstanding complex situations is another repetitive behaviour which has led to 
major blunders throughout the campaign against al-Shabaab in Somalia. Similar to U.S. funding of 
Afghan soldiers fighting the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War, U.S. early involvement in funding Somali 
warlords, then the Ethiopian invasion, helped to create al-Shabaab.186  In researching the 
consequences of counter-terrorism efforts of one state in another, Hussein Solomon outlines 
several reasons that the U.S. and its partners are bound to fail in Somalia. Solomon begins with the 
argument that western countries tend to ignore historical precedents such as previous political 
movements in the region or state involved. In Afghanistan, the Bush administration took a philistine 
approach to one incident of terror. It bound the troubling situation in a predominantly Muslim 
country directly with al-Qaeda and aggressively constructed an anti-Islamic narrative. As such, the 
Bush administration conditioned itself to focus on only one very small aspect of the whole. Early in 
its counter-terrorism involvement in Somalia, U.S. politician and military personnel similarly 
determined the ICU to be detrimental to its geopolitical interests in the region. As such, it passed 
swift judgment without addressing the intricacies and details that made up the organisation. We 
know this to be true based upon the contradictory responses provided by the State Department 
during that period.187 In fact, in 2010, Said Samatar prognosticated that the U.S. was on the brink of 
a confused and drawn out engagement against al-Shabaab in Somalia and surrounding countries 
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partly because of its narrow understanding.188 Samatar’s assessment, made two years after al-
Shabaab was listed by the State Department as a foreign terrorist organisation supports the 
argument that a designation fails completely to help build a complex or holistic understanding of 
those the U.S. considers to be its enemy. As was the case in Afghanistan and Vietnam, the U.S. was 
ahistorical in its handling of the ICU and contextually unaware of the volatile ecosystem which 
resulted in the expansion of al-Shabaab. For Samatar and others like Steve Smith, rushing counter-
terrorism operations before completing a background analysis continues to result in ill-fitting 
short-term strategy, which will inevitably continue to transform over time. There exists a sub-field 
of critical counter-terrorism scholars that posit the distinct lack of ahistorical context and lack of 
social and cultural understanding to be reasons behind near continuous yet faulty U.S. involvement 
in foreign countries.189 The U.S. has been involved in several counter-terrorism campaigns in 
multiple countries and each has resulted in a lasting endeavour, possibly due to misreading the 
local population and misinterpreting social and political factors on the ground. Moving forward, 
politicians and policy makers should gain insight by observing how sustained failure to grasp local 
affairs and underestimated regional complexities in Somalia has also resulted in lasting, unresolved 
involvement. Overlooking these same conditions helped to create the quagmire in Afghanistan. As a 
determinant, revisionism weighs whether or not time and cost factors legitimise outcomes and 
assesses whether the implemented strategy requires re-evaluation. For that reason, revisionism is 
instrumental in understanding what a successful counter-terrorism strategy might look like 
through its process of cataloguing change in ineffective strategy and providing evidence of stable, 
effective, and lasting strategic application. The strategy in Somalia has caused lasting damage to the 
country and kept the United States involved since 2002. Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen published 
an article in 2007 citing the U.S. approach to the ‘Greater Horn of Africa’ as erratic, shortsighted and 
narrow. Their research stressed the interweaving of conflicts within the region and the subsequent 
difficulty of unilateral actors conducting terrorist operations.190 The lack of cogent strategy in 
Somalia has been a consequence of ‘decision-making from a distance’ combined with short term 
counter-terrorism and foreign policy mapping, as determined by Ken Menkhaus in 2006.191  
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Implications of Complex/ Combined Counter-terrorism Strategy in Somalia  
 
Dependency and increased recruitment were two early consequences of the chosen strategy of U.S. 
counter-terrorism in Somalia. Both the TFG and Ethiopia became reliant upon the U.S. to function as 
it required. Figure 3 shows that U.S. aid to Somalia jumped from $84 million in 2006 to $275 million 
by 2008.192 A majority of that aid was provided to the TFG in the form of humanitarian and 
developmental assistance, suggesting that the struggling government remained unable to deliver 
basic services to its starving population. Ethiopia was the top recipient of U.S. aid in 2008.193 While 
most of that funding was distributed through the Department of Agriculture – the eastern part of 
the country was affected by drought – $ 277 million was funneled through the Department of 
State.194 The large aid package signified the readiness of the U.S. to assist and promote Ethiopia in 
its regional endeavours. The second consequence of re-engagement in Somalia was the cultivation 
of a substantial recruitment pool. Violence has the ability to breed animus. In Somalia, the invasion 
of a foreign antagonist caused local young men, who were already limited in their economic 
opportunity, to consider some of the hard-liner factions, which would eventually become al-
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Shabaab, for financial gains or, to avenge the death of a family member or acquaintance.195 
Consequently, al-Shabaab gained power with each day of the Ethiopian incursion. When Ethiopia 
withdrew, the terrorist organisation and its soldiers were seen as heroes. Both consequences would 
affect the further development and application of complex/ combined counter-terrorism in Somalia 
in the coming years.  
Washington’s repetitive failure to understand embedded ideological and cultural 
differences that are not shared by both states continuously halts America’s ability to see past its 
ideological, perhaps religious war. Due to unrest following the fall of Somali dictator Siad Barre in 
1991, the State Department closed its embassy and failed to appoint an ambassador to the country 
until 2015. During that period, government related travel was restricted for officials and diplomatic 
communications between actors was limited. Alone, this decision indicates a political determination 
to remove diplomacy from the table for over a decade. Removing agents from the location of 
conflict disabled Washington’s ability to gather information or to grasp the highly diverse and 
dynamic issues at stake. The lack of diplomatic presence further separated the goals of the U.S. from 
the realities on the ground. For instance, without officials on the ground, speaking with Somalis 
every day and experiencing life from within the country, how could the American government 
properly take the nation's temperature or gain insight from infighting and small-scale skirmishes? 
A concrete consequence of years of inaction on the part of the U.S. is the millions of Somalis who 
were forced to endure lasting violence and insecurity in their home. That struggle continues to be 
reflected today, making trust and reliability in a foreign country a difficult if not impossible task.   
Al-Shabaab also represents the larger, rarely discussed narrative of increased Islamist 
ideology spreading across Muslim parts of Africa. Globalization, historical disenfranchisement, and 
decades of foreign institutions forcing neoliberal financial schemes and ideals upon entire nations 
fostered inequality, discontent, and distrust.196 Perhaps setting a goal to limit the effectiveness and 
influence of terrorist organizations rather than working to permanently eliminating them is the 
direction in which counter-terrorism strategists must move. In 1987, L. Paul Bremer remarked that 
a small group of individuals willing to die during an attack could paralyze their foe, inflict fear and 
shock into a population and make the smaller group seem more powerful than its means.197 In the 
piece Six Unusual Propositions about Terrorism, John Mueller reasons that, “policies designed to deal 
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with terrorism should focus more on reducing fear and anxiety as inexpensively as possible rather 
than on objectively reducing the rather limited dangers terrorism is likely actually to pose.”198 For 
al-Shabaab to thrive in Somalia it needs an outside enemy. Hussein Solomon points out that in the 
past Washington has obliged this requirement.199 It seems that the U.S. has begun to learn that 
lesson, and to some extent has been operating from outside the country and working to ensure the 
FGS is not seen as another puppet of a foreign government. To return to President Farmajo’s 
questioning of U.S. strategic interests in Somalia, this review has found that a majority of the actions 
taken since 2006 have been self-serving on the part of American interests, which aid in the 
arguments made not only by critical academics but also by al-Shabaab.  
In 2002, James Phillips wrote a piece in which he explained that Somalia, “may become the 
next front in the global war against international terrorism.” Of Somalia, Phillips wrote that if the 
U.S. were to intervene in the country, it would discover anarchy, which makes the country 
extremely unpredictable, citing internal politics as tumultuous and risky.200 At the time, Phillips laid 
out six guidelines for keeping U.S. counter-terrorism in Somalia “focused”: 
 
1) Keep al-Qaeda leaders from establishing a base in Somalia  
2) Bolster intelligence-gathering inside the country 
3) Focus on fighting al-Qaeda, avoid mission creep 
4) Cooperate with Ethiopia and Kenya to curb Islamic radicalisation  
5) Cultivate Somali allies to combat al-Qaeda 
6) Use covert CIA, special operations, and precision air strikes to target al-Qaeda cells 
 
Looking back on these guidelines this critical analysis has demonstrated that the strategic 
methods of bolstering intelligence, using military tactical operations rather than a full invasion, and 
cultivating friendships in the region have led to objective failure in Somalia. Washington has been 
unable to avoid mission creep. Local civilian goodwill toward America and its western allies 
continue to sink with each civilian death. Not only is al-Qaeda still present in Somalia but it is 
aligned with al-Shabaab, who remain undefeated after nearly ten years of targeted counter-
terrorism efforts. As for U.S. regional allies, Ethiopia and Kenya are struggling with internal 
division, wresting them unable and increasingly unwilling to tackle unending issues in Somalia, 
making multilateral cooperation difficult. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Further Research    
This dissertation presented the nature of contemporary U.S. counter-terrorism strategy toward 
Somalia and how it has been determined and sustained over time. U.S. counter-terrorism strategy 
has been shaped since 2002 by terrorism related events, regional geopolitical relationships, 
institutional rivalries and bureaucratic systems. U.S. counter-terrorism toward Somalia has 
undergone several iterations of complex/combined counter-terrorism strategy since first engaging 
in combating al-Shabaab. There have been notable revisions in the same strategy, often relating to 
one of the aforementioned determinants. This dissertation has shown the constant state of 
movement in which counter-terrorism operates but also the institutional and constructed confines 
in which it is determined. It has been determined that U.S. counter-terrorism strategy in Somalia 
moves within and across a spectrum by which different degrees soft and hard power dynamics are 
emphasized within the same strategy. Across that spectrum, the United States counter-terrorism 
strategy in Somalia has transformed over time from one which focused on containing al-Qaeda to 
one aimed at eliminating al-Shabaab. Initial methods involving clandestine operations and funding 
regional allies transformed over time to one determined to neutralise and disarm the local militia 
group with the use of drones and U.S. military personnel training and accompanying Somali 
National Security Forces.  
The United States has consistently prioritised a light military footprint and maintained low 
costs of involvement in combating al-Shabaab. Operations against the terrorist group rely heavily 
on special operations units and the use of targeted drones and airstrikes.  In recent years, U.S. 
counter-terrorism has also shifted to include funding and training to local security forces with 
support and advising roles undertaken by U.S. military personnel.  There have also been noticeable 
signs of comity and commitment, with humanitarian aid and light-handed diplomacy increasing. 
One thing that has not changed since early involvement is the level of public engagement. 
Awareness of and required approval of counter-terrorism involvement by American civilians has 
remained limited.  
This study observed a trend of revisionist behaviour in U.S. counter-terrorism strategy. That 
revisionism, researched here as a determinant of counter-terrorism, is most likely associated with 
short term decision-making processes as they exist within the field. Further study into the 
approximate period of time allotted for a strategy to achieve success or fail could shed light on the 
reason behind prevalent revisionist behaviour in counter-terrorism strategy. This dissertation also 
researched the role of institutions in determining counter-terrorism strategy. While Jackson and 
others have begun researching the role of institutional rivalry in policy, further investigation into 
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the role of individual institutions in counter-terrorism without a specific focus on Somalia could 
support findings made within this dissertation. Finally, the consistently limited role of public 
knowledge or engagement in complex/combined counter-terrorism strategies is one that requires 
further study.  
 The AMISOM mandate in Somalia is set to end in 2018. Some partner nations have already 
been pulling troops home. The ‘hollowing out’ of AMISOM forces reflects not only an exhausted 
international community but a newly developing regional environment.201 Ethiopia and Kenya, who 
had made up a large portion of the security force, are facing internal ethnic instability and violence. 
Similar ethno-political violence maligns Burundi, which withdrew some of its troops in 2015 to 
combat post-election violence. Uganda remains committed to the mission, although in recent years 
it has jockeyed politically for additional funding to ensure commitment of troops to AMISOM 
operations.202 And the United States has shifted its foreign policy agenda as it relates to counter-
terrorism in Somalia to one that moves away from non-military strategies of diplomacy such as 
state-building and leans heavily on the military-enforced side of the complex/combined counter-
terrorism spectrum. As terrorist related insecurity continues to threaten the country and the 
region, we can expect the U.S. to stay the current course, unless seismic activity in the region forces 
a change in strategy. The complete withdrawal of AMISOM forces would be an event of such nature 
and at the very least would force a shift, if not a complete change, in U.S. counter-terrorism strategy 
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